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The Cnited States ~nd Japan have shared a close relationship since the end of Workl War 
U Wbat began as a victor-and-vanquished relationship was transforrnetl into one of the rold 
War's pillars of Containment. Now Ihe Cold War is over yet the Cnitetl States remains 
responsible for the external defense of t.he stat.e that possesses the world's sewnd most 
powerful cwnomy. Simultaneousl}, Japan is attempting to end its tradition of political 
isolationism. As Japan exercises ever increasing autonomy and less deference to U.S. policy 
and desires, the administration, congress, and American public are searching for the elusive 
"peace dividend' 
Should Japan continue to progress toward the ultimate goal of ' normal nation" status, those 
animosities now present primarily in the trade realm may spill-over into the political and 
security arena,. Additionally, the I August 1994 edition of the Mainichi Shimhun reponed 
that the Japanese Foreign Ministry SITretly decided, in 1969, to develop the potential to make 
nuclear weapons without acrually producing them. The same report indicated that the 
"potential" had been met. Now another eomplicatiollto the relationship has emerged. \Vhilc it 
is understandable for hpan to desire an indigenous nuclear deterrent capability, hpans status 
as a virn4al proliferator runs contrary to U.S. nonproliferation policy. 
I"his thesis explores t.he future of the \Tnited States-Japan relationship considering the: 
current international environment -- a seemingly absent ruison d·erre. Recommcndadons for a 
revised Japan policy including an innovarive approach to allied nuclear proliferation are 
presented 
vi 
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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY 
The Cold War is over. With the collapse of the Soviet Union, pundits and 
prophets alike have begun to publish their tomes of the future in a uni-poiar, uncc:rtain 
world. George Bush spoke of a "New World Order " when he was president. Others 
like Francis Fukuyama, Samuel P. Huntington , and Robert D. Kaplan were much less 
optimistic in their vis ions of the fu ture entitled, "The End of History ,' The Clash of 
Civilizations?,' and 'The Coming Anarchy." respectively. The common thread among 
all these predicti()n~ has been a shift 10 something new and yet unseen -- a radical 
dynamic with near-catastrophic consequences. 
Those who have written about the Uni ted Stales-Japan relationship in the post-Cold 
War world have stressed concepts in the context of words such as "redefining. 
reexamining. and reevaluating." The implication is that the United States-Japan 
relationship is somehow tlawed due to the absence of its most recent raison d'erre, the 
Soviet threat. 
Japan possesses the world's second most powerful economy yct another nation, the 
United States, is responsible for Japanese ex.ternal defense. The Gulf War provided 
Japan with an intense signal that highlighted the atrophy of its political and military 
capabilities. Since that time, Japan has embark.ed upon a course that will attempt to 
terminate its political isolationism. The current leadership has publicly articulatt:rl the 
desire to obtain a permanent seat on the United Nations Security Council. The recent 
trade disputes between the United States and Japan are indicalive of less deference LO 
U.S. desires and a greater emphasis on Japanese self-interest and autonomy. Should 
Japan continue to progress toward "normal nation" status as has been advocated by the 
popular politician and author, 07.awa Ichiro, the animosities than have been limited 10 
the realm of trade may spill-over into the political and security arenas. 
This need not happen. Both countries , however, will have to change the way they 
conduct business with the othcr. The United States musl be willing to accept a Japan 
that exhibits less deference to U.S. policy while simultaneously exercising more 
poli tical autonomy. Japan must be willing to initiate serious reforms of its trade 
praGtices to include restructuring the internal commodities dis tr ibution system. Japan 
will not be able to take what it perceives as its rightful place among the industrialired 
powers of the world so long as its market protections remain in place. 
Japan's emergence as a "normal nation" may include a desire \0 possess an 
indigenous nuclear deterrent capabili ty. While this is unlikely so long as the U.S. 
,nuclear umbrella remains extended, Japan currently can be classified as a virtual 
proliferator. A recently released (August 1994), formerly Top Secret document of the 
Japanese Foreign Ministry outlined a plan under which Japan would develop the 
potential to make nuclear weapons without actually producing them. The same report 
in the Mainichi Shimbun indicated that the "potential " had been met. Japanese "nuclear 
breakout " would be contrary to U.S. nonproliferation policy. 
After nearly five decades of sharing a close rdation.~hip , the United States and 
Japan are not destined to part ways on a sour note. The relationship has been 
evolutionary rather than static. What began as a victor-and-vanquished relationship in 
1945 wa~ transformed into an anti-Soviet security relationship five years later. There is 
no rea~on to believe that the anti-Soviet relationsh ip cannot be transformed into a truly 
equal partnership founded on the concept~ of mutual benefit, regional security and 
international g()(xlwill, 
In addition to the evolutionary nature of the relationship, it has also bcen pragmatic , 
Economic interdependence alone mandates a continuation of the rela tionship. 
Additionally , a~ Japan seeks to expand its political participation in regional affairs , a 
continuing relat ionship with the United States i~ the optimum mechanism to allay the 
fears of Japan's still wary neighbors. 
The United States is committed to continued engagemenl in the East Asian-Pacific 
region. Excepting Canada. the majority of U.S . trade is conducted with the nations of 
Ea..~t Asia. Regional stability is therefore a vital national interest of the United States. 
The cornerstone of regional security in East Asia is the United States-Japan 
relationship. That relationship should take its place as one of the major pillars of any 
future East Asian security architecture. The common good of the participanl5 as wel l 




Prior to the arrival in Tokyo Ray of Commoc!ore Matthew C Perry's East 
India Squadron, the only exposure between Japanese and Americans came as a result of 
whaling encounters on the high seas or the rescue of shipwrecked mariners. Japan was 
"closed" to the rest of the world except for a small segregated enclave of Dutch traders . 
Perry was able to succeed where two American and many European expeditions before 
him had fai led. The negotiations that transpired nearly a century and one half ago gave 
birth to some concepts that are equally valuable today as the United States and Japan 
continue to spar in the complex arena of international relations in the post-Cold War 
Commodore Perry conducted exhaustive study prior to his cxpe<l ition in order to 
educate himself in the ways of the Japanese. Even without the benefit of sophisticated 
information exchange systems, country experts, and expatriates in hoth countries. Perry 
knew that the key to success would be found in understanding the Japanese culture. He 
sought to deal wi th the Japanese under conditions with which they could identify. He 
insisted upon equality among all relationships of like rank. He was instructed to use a 
carrot rather than a stick. Perry wanted the Japanese Shogun to desire a relationship 
with the United States. He wenl to immense lengths to provide a hands-on view of 
America's finest technological achievements . Such objects Perry hoped would 
convince the Shogun of the benefits of establishing relations with the United States. 
Perry and the Shogun both realized something else: Politics and diplomacy 
precede trade and commerce. In fact, the Shogun not desiring trade with the United 
States, almost refused the exchange of diplomatic officers as he knew how dosely trade 
and pOlitics were linked. He wished to avoid embarking upon an irreversible course. 
The Shogun. however, did consent to the exchange of consuls. Two yt:MS later, a 
trade tn:aty was signed. 
Perry's ·opening of Japan" is also illustrative of the final dement of most 
international relations: military might. "The treaty was to be imposed through pomp. 
circumstance, hearing and dignity, not through the cannon's mouth." (Hagan. 1991, p. 
148) Nevertheless, Perry's squadron of fire-hreathing, gun-dad, "black" ships in 
Tokyo harbor created an indelible impression on Emperor Meiji who rose to power in 
1868. Japan too would have a strong military or be forever subject to the desires of her 
political enemies. 
Perry's expedition reminds us that there are three primary and inseparable 
elements within the construct of international relations: political, economic, and 
military affairs. While each usually has a unique policy for specific guidance, they are 
akin to the three sides of a triangle -- each depending on the other twO for stability, 
form. and suppOrt. 
Perry himself reminds us of yet another aspect of international relations. Thc 
way in which you deal with your opponent has nearly as much to do with the outcome 
as the benefit(s) of the outcome itself. Perry collected as much information on 
Japanese culture as was possible for that day. He wanted to he able to interact with the 
Japanese from their perspective rather than one -- both Western and uniquely American 
-- they did not understand . 
Despite today's technological similarities of the United States and Japan, the 
cultures could not be more different. Despite the democratic government fa.~hioned "in 
our imagc' by the MacArthur administered government, the political and economic 
institutions of the twO states are more dissimilar tha n they are alike. Of all the 
industrialized countries, the United States and Japan are the least similar (Hofstede, 
1980, pp. 148-175). Mirror-imaging, a tactic often employed when developing a 
strategy for foreign policy, is virtually ineffectivc in such an environment. Mirror-
imaging can only work when the perceptions of the all the pol icy makers in all of the 
concerned states are nearly identical. 
The United States prides itself on the rights of individuals. In Japan, the 
individual is always subordinate to the group whether that group is the family, 
corporation , or nation. With such a fundamenta l difference, how can one deal with the 
other in the absence of an appreciation and understanding of opposing mlturcs? 
With the end of the Cold War, the underlying prem ise for intervent ion and 
security alliances -- containment -- disappeared a~ well. This is not to say, however, 
that the power-balancing strategies of the past have no plaee in the present or future. 
Rather, the post-Cold War strategy must be geared to the preservation of regional 
stability. In the absence of an identifiable unitlli"y threat, the strategy of bilateral 
agreements as the foundation of countervailing alJiances requires serious overhaul. 
While the relative power of the United States increased dramatically with the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, the absolute po..wer of the United States is in decline. The result 
will be a United States that is less capable and therefore less likely to intervene. The 
chief of logistics for ground forces during Operations Desert Shield and Desert Storm, 
Major General Gus Pagonis. USA, recently stated that a similar operation of the same 
scale could not be conducted today due to the force reductions that have already taken 
place . (Pagonis.4 May 1995) 
In the absence of a common foe, antagonisms arc unleashed as cooperation is 
less crucial to national survival. Focus shifts from the common good of the alliance 
partners to self interest of the individual ~tate.~ . Not only should this be self-evident, 
hut cooperation for mutual benefit should join military necessity as complementary 
cohesive bonds of a relationship, While conflict and conflict resolution are omnipresent 
clements of the international system. they do nOt permeate all relationships at ali times. 
During their absence, mutual benefit could easily supplement national interest a~ the 
operative premi~e of foreign affairs. After all, the "mutual benefit of mankind" has 
been the basis for international Jaw since the time of Hugo Grotius. 
The roots of the United States-Japan relationship do not immediately spring 
forth from the Perry expedition. It cannOt and should not be discounted a~ a 
monumental step for hoth countries. The current relationship. however, was horn in 
the crucible of the Japanese defeat in World War II and faithfully nurtured by the Cold 
War. In order to craft a vision for the future, the evolution of United States-Japan 
relations must be analyzed within its proper context. The Cold War rcplaced Japane~e 
disarmament as the raison d'€tre of the United States-Japan Mutual Security and 
Cooperation Treaty The past evolution of the United States-Japan relationship 
indicates that systemic changes mandatc<l a modification of policy. The world has 
changed again. Events are no longer perceived within thc context of a bipolar world . 
As Japan grows stronger, seeking to assume a larger role in world affairs, the United 
States' absolute power is waning. Their common foe , the former Soviet Union, is no 
longer the threat it was during the Culd War. Consequently, the United States-Japan 
relatiuJL~hip should be examined to determine whether it should be modified to reflect 
the current reali ty. As with German and Japanese rearmament, the relationship can 
move forward without being totally dismantled. Yet it still must reflect the not only 
the current realities of the international system but those of the United States and Japan 
as well. 
This thesis will examine United States-Japan policy since World War II in an 
attempt to develop a revised policy that is consistent with U,S. national interest while 
treating Japan as an equal rather than subordinate partner. As discussed above, the 
polit ical, economic, and mil itary manifestations of policy are interdependent and nearly 
jru;cparable. Whlle this analysis will focus on the military aspect of United States-
Japan relatioru;, this aspect cannot be trealed as if it existed in a vacuum, 
Consequently. the political and economic aspects will be examined to a lesser extent. 
While it may seem that United States-Japan relations arc entering a primarily 
economic arena, this phenomena reflects the current source of antagonism. Unequal 
trade practices plagued the Nixon administration , hut American involvement in 
Vietnam provided a greater problem on which the Japanese could focus. The mutual 
security (military) relationship -- born of disarmament; nurtured by the Cold War -
enjoys virrual status quo yet its foundation has been shaken the hardest by recent 
events. Japanese political turmoil and American preoccupation with domestic issues 
have put a damper on routine foreign policy endeavors in both countries . Spill-over of 
antagonisms from one venue to the other is unavoidable, especially when the U.S. 
Secretary of State has also played the role of its chief trade negotiator. 
The United States-Japan relationship is strained hut it is not on an irreversible 
course toward dissolution. As Clausewitz noted concerning war, the means must be 
consistent with the ends -- the strategy consistent with the policy . The United States' 
Japan policy is floundering under (a minimum of) two constraints grounded in the past: 
the Cold War and Japan's protege stams. This thesis will examine the reasons for the 
die-hard legacies hampering change and develop recommendations for a revised policy 
for the United States-Japan relationship. The sooner the policy is brought up to date, 
the sooner an operative. beneficiaL and equal partnership could result. 
II. 1945-1968: R~;CONSTRUCTION, THE COLD WAR, AND THE 
ECONO:vlIC :vIIRACLE 
A. AN END A.'ID A BEG[\'NUI."G: 1945-1951 
rhe current relalionship between the United States and Japan can be directly 
traced to the end of World War II. From the time of surrender in 1945 until the 
signing of the San Francisco Peace Treaty in 1951, Japan, the vanquished, was 
completely dependent upon the United States, the victor, for its existence .. For all 
intents and purposes, lapan ccao,cd to exist as a sovereign nation-state in 1945. The 
immediate purpose of U.S. policy was to ensure that. Japan could never again pursue a 
campaign of military adventurism and territorial conquest. The Imperial government 
that had embarked upon that course in 1931 was suhjected to the tia! of the U.S 
occupatIon. The ilb of the pa~t would have to be purged and rectified prior to 
emharkation on a path to the future. Consequently, the "relationship" bct.,veen the 
United States and Japan wa~ nothing less than a one-sided affair. "Ine United States 
gave the orders and Japan followed them. Japan had no choice. With no military, the 
economy in ruin, and an American general running its government, Japan's future 
mandated compliance with U.S. desires. However distasteful this was for the Japanese 
at the beginning, the emerging world order ensured that the total subordination of the 
Japanese nation-state was a temporary situation. After two years of occupation, the 
vanqui~hed would become an ally with a new government created ill the democmtic 
Image. 
1. The Policy of Containment 
While Japan was beginning its reconstruction, U.S. national security strategy 
was galvanized through the articulation of the policy of ·containment.· Born of the 
observations and analysis of George Kennan and later refined by Paul Niue into 
National Security Council Memorandum 68 (NSC-68), the former' advocated 
containment of the Soviet Union while the latter expanded the concept to include the 
containment of Communism. 
Kennan's two expositions are now known as the long telegram and "The 'X' 
Article.' The first was a diplomatic dispatch from Moscow where he was stationed at 
the U.S . embassy and the second was an article anonymously submitted to the quarterly 
journal, Foreign Affairs. Both called for a strong U.S. response to the growing Soviet 
threat. Specifically, the combination of hostility and capability, unique to the Soviet 
Union alone, had to be ·contained. · Neither the long telegram nor the "X Article" nor 
any of Kennan's countless policy papers undertook a systematic formulation of his 
program. (Gaddis, 1982, pp. 54-55, 89) Nevertheless, many of the policy 
recommendations of Kennan's Policy Planning Staff were indee(j implemented by the 
Truman administration during the years 1947-1949. 
The void resulting from Kennan's aversion to written policy guidelines was 
fi lled by NSC-68, drafted by Kennan's successor as head of the State Department's 
Policy Planning Staff in Washington, Paul H. Nitze , President Truman authoriled the 
comprehensive study that resulterl in NSC-68 following the "shocks of 1949. " These 
"shocks" were manifest in the "loss· of China to communism as well as the Soviet's 
first atomic detonation , The United States had emerged from World War II as both a 
superpower and leader. It was now clear that the leader of the free world needed a well 
articulated national security policy and a comprehensive strategy to accomplish that 
policy. NSC-68 provided just such guidance, The invasion of South Korea by the 
communisT-supported troops of the North provided the impetus for The implementation 
of NSC-68. The principles and strategy outlined in NSC-68 codified containment 
which became the cornerstone of U.S. foreign policy for the next 40 years. 
It is somewhat ironic that a policy that was Eurocentric in design was th rust to 
I the forefront of U.S. foreign policy by an event in East Asia. Containment was 
nevertheless a "Europe First " policy . Kennan advocated defense of three areas of the 
world that were of strategic interest to the United SUiteS: the Rh ine Valley , Lireal 
Britain. and Japan. (Jervis, 1980, p. 573) Although NSC-68 called for a "perimeter" 
rather than strategic interest strategy, the emphasis, like Kennan's, was upon Europe. 
As [urtller evidence of thc Eurocentrie nature of early Cold War strategy, all 300 
atomic warheads in the U. S. stockpile were committed to the defense of Europe and 
therefore never seriously considered for employment in Korea despite'the dire situation 
that forced the retreat to the "Pusan perimeter.· (Brodie, 1973, p. 64) 
While Kennan and Nitze continued to disagree on the means to achieve 
containment, they substantially agreed on the end. Common elements to their 
approaches sought to establish and nurture countervailing centers of power along the 
periphery of the Soviet Union. In Europe this meant the implementation of the 
Marshall Plan, the establishment of NATO, and later the rearmament of Germany . In 
East Asia, where a war between superpower proxies was already underway, this meant 
the end of the U.S. occupation of Japan and the beginning of a relationship under 
which Japan would be allied with the United States against the Soviet Union. Peace 
treaties would be required to enable the next phase of post-World War II relations. 
2. Tbe Treaty of Peace with Japan 
On September 8,1951, Japan signed a peace treaty with twelve Allie<i Powers'! 
Of the • AI lie<i Powers· with which the state of war was terminated, the United States 
was included. The Soviet Union was not. 
The Treaty disposed of nearly all of the war-related issues between the 
signatories. AdditionaHy, it restored Japanese sovereignty (in the eyes of all but the 
USSR) and provided for the end of the occupation by U.S. forces. The withdrawal of 
1 The twelve "Allied Powers" referred to throughout the Treaty are: Australia, 
Canada, Ceylon, France, lndonesia, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Great Britain, Northern lreland, and the United States. 
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occupation troops, however, as stated in the sentence immediately following, did not 
preclude 
.. . the stationing or retention of foreign armed forces in Japanese 
territory under or in consequence of bilateral or multilateral agreements 
wh ich have been or may be made between one or more of the Allied 
Powers, on the onc hand, and Japan on the other (Art 6 (a). Treaty of 
Peace with lapan) 
It also provided for lapane.~e self-defense as follows: 
The Allied Powers for their part recognize that Japan as a sovereign 
Nation possesses the inherent Tight of self-defense referred to in Article 
51 of the Charter of the United Nations and that Japan may voluntarily 
enter into collective security arrangements. (Art S(c) Treaty of Peace 
with Japan) 
The Security Treaty Between the United States of America and Japan wa.<; 
signed the very same day in San Francisco. Two years earlier, General MacArthur had 
said, that Japan's future security 'should be arranged by bilateral agreement with the 
United States.' (Sebald, 1965 p. 247) It is the relationship codified by the original 
treaty and the subsequent revision in 1960 that remains thc basis of United States· Japan 
relations today. 
3. The United States-.Japan Securit~· Treaty 
"With the bilateral treaty between the United States and Japan the framework 
for security in the Far East was establ is hed.' (Sehald, 1965, p. 282) In conjunction 
IL 
with restoration of sovereignty and the end of the occupation, Japan had to provide for 
external defense. 
Japan has this day .~igned a Treaty of Pca.ce with the Allied Powers. On 
the coming into force of that Treaty, Japan will not have effective mca.ns 
to exercise its inherent right of self defen.'\e because it has been 
disarmed. (U.S. Dept. of State, 1955, p. 3329) 
Unwilling to rearm and enter into a regional collective security alliance similar 
to NATO, Japan under the very skillful guidance of Prime Minister Yoshida formalized 
a security guarantee with the United States. This arrangement that has endured through 
the present was not only a matter of necessitY but a carefully calculated endeavor that 
would allow Japan to concentrate its national capital on economic reconstruction rather 
than on external defense. 
This is not to say that the United States failed to benefit. While Japan wa~ able 
to mobilize the population and national capital for economic recovery, the United States 
'received in return excellent facilities for basing U.S. forces in support of its policy of 
containment. While both sides had legitimate concerns regarding inequality, both .~ides 
reaped very tangible benefits. 
The' Japanese became increasingly aware that they were the inferior partner in 
an unequal treaty.' (Oppler, 1983, p. 166) Consequently, in 1960 the Treaty was 
revised to address some of the Japanese concerns of inequality. In fact, the words 
"mutual" and "cooperation" were added. The revised document would be known as the 
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Treaty of Mutual Cooperation and Security Between the United States of America and 
Japan. This was intended to be , however, a much more symbolic than operative 
modification. The Japanese continued to eS[Xlllse that the overseas deployment of 
troops was unconst itutional. Although the Treaty provided mutual benefit, mutual 
security in the literal sense was still lacking. Japanese troops could not fight outside of 
Japan. Still, it served the security interests of both the United States and Japan. 
Japanese disarmament was no longer the tTue raison d'itre for the Treaty . The 
evolution of the postwar order, specifically the bipolarity of the Cold War and the 
resultant U.S. policy of containment through forma l alliances and bilateral 
relationships. mandated a continuation of the United States-Japan security relationship. 
The end had changed but the means were still relevant. Ordinarily. this is nOithe case. 
4. The Japanese Constitution 
While this event seems to he out of the chronolugical order, the constilUtion 
bears little more than symbolic significance prior to the resturation of national 
sovereignty. In February 1946, General MacArthur tasked his staff with the drafting of 
a Japanese Constitution. 
The American and Japanese leadership had differing priorities regarding the 
postwar governing of Japan. As the constitution would provide the framework, 
MacArthur feari ng Japanese militarism, thought it essential for it to include a clause 
renouncing war. While the war renunciation clause was subsequently modified by the 
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Diet prior to adoption, Article IX is the unique element of the constitution mat is 
responsible for the common reference to the Japanese Con~titution as the Peace 
Constitution. In its final version it reads: 
Aspiring sincerely to an international peace based on justice and 
order, the Japanese people forever renounce war as a sovereign right of a 
nation and the threat or use of force as a means of settling international 
disputes . 
In order to accomplish the aim of the preceding paragraph. land , sea, 
and air forces, as well as other war potential, will never be maintaineU. 
The right of belligerency of the state will not be recognized . (Japanese 
Constitution) 
War was forever renounced. as a sovereign right of the nation. Standing 
(offensive) military forces would be unconstitutional. It must be remembered, 
however. that what are today 'uniquely Japanese concepts,' the renunciation of war 
and the retention of forces only for self-defense, flowed from the pen of an American. 
Colonel Charles Kades, the principal drafter. (Pyle, 1992, p. 9) While this conceptual 
banner has been touted for the last 45 years by the Japanese Socialist Party as a 
praiseworthy and unique ideal, it wa~, nevertheless, imposed upon Japan by the United 
States. 
Political and economic necessity fash ioned Japan 's rebirth as a sovereign nation-
Albeit sovereign, Japan was and remains dependent upon the United States for 
external security. Yoshida Shigeru accepted this dependency and was the architt:ct of a 
strategy tbat would maximize the benefits of this relationship for Japan. 
14 
5. The Yoshida Doctrine 
In September 1951, Yoshida Shigeru, thcn Japanese Prime Minister, affixed his 
signature to several documents that would guide his nation through reconstruction and a 
return to pseudo-normalcy. His concepts and companion policies have become known 
as the Yoshida Doctrine. While the political elements of the policy could not exist 
without their security-bascd and economic counterparts, his pol itical vision and the 
resultant policies placed Japan on a nearly-irreversible course to recovery . In the 
spring of 1946, Yoshida remarked to a colleague in the cabinet, "history provides 
examples of winning hy diplomacy after losing in war.· (Kosaka, 1968, p. 5) By 
'casting his lot" with the United States throughout his tenure which ran coincident with 
the opening forays of the Cold War, he was able to concentrate Japan's effort~ on the 
economy rather than incurring massive expenditures for external defense. 
In the desolat ion and despair of the postwar days, when Japan was a 
virtual international pariah and the nation's fonunes were at the lowest 
point in history, Yoshida gradually put together a sense of national 
purpose that has guided the country to the present. (Pyle, 1992, p. 21) 
Yoshida's strategy fell in with the desires of John Foster Dulles, speGial 
emissary of the Secretary of State, who knew that a NATO-like, collective security 
alliam:e in the Pacific would not be accepted by the U.S. Senate. Yoshida was one of 
the first to use Article IX of the Japanese Constitution as a lever against the United 
States. His commitment to economic recovery was immovable. Additionally, he 
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believed that Japan should remain lightly armed and avoid international poJitical-
strategic issues. The final tenet of the Yoshida Doctrine was to obtain a long-term 
security guarantee from the United States. To this end, Japan would provide ba.o;cs for 
U.S . forces. (Pyle 1992, p. 25) 
Yoshida in is his desire to avoid regional collective security had to settle for a 
highly unequal mutual security treaty with the United States. Similarly, he had to 
follow the lead of the United States and recognize Taipei rather than Beijing as the 
legitimate government of Ch ina. On September 8, 1951, Yoshida committed his nation 
to a politically restrictive but economically advantageous future. While he later 
expressed regrets for his strategy, the resultant national prosperity speaks for itself. 
The two immed iate successors to Yoshida attempted to reverse the trend of the 
economics-tirst policy. They governed from 1955-1960 . The revised Security Treaty 
of 1960 is indicative of their effons. Similarly, they wanted to amend the constitution 
and rearm . Neither of these initiat ives came to fruition due to the opposition of the 
Japanese Socialist Party . 
Despite the five-year attempt to roll-back the Yoshida Doctrine, 1960 saw the 
election of Prime Minister Ikeda, a former member of the Yoshida government. He 
was followed by Sato, another Yoshida protege, who served until 1972. The twelve-
year period of their combined reign insured that the Yoshida Doctrine became 
entrenched and institutionalized. (Pyle, 1992, pp. 32-33) 
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B . .JAPAK ENTERS TIlE NUCLRAR AGE: ATOMS FOR PEACE 
Simultaneous with the postwar reconstruction was the development of nuclcar 
nonproliferation policy in the Unitcd States. The foundations of the Acheson-Lilt:nthal 
and Baruch Plans were unmistakable: The United States was predestincd to he the 
guardian of nuclear technology. When the Soviet Union exploded ilS Cirs t nuclear 
device in 1949, the monopoly was gone but the overriding principle remained inlact. 
The 'end." U.S. control, remained. Thc "means , " howevcr, changed. Rather than 
exclude other nations from the access to technology , it would he extended to allies so 
long as the United States remained in ultimate control. The Atoms [or Peace Plan 
became the new "means." The United States would extend technology and financial 
assistance so long as the recipient country pledged to peaceful use and abided by U _S -
mandated safegllilTds. The United Slates dictated the disposition of plutonium in an 
additional effort to ensure safeguard compliance. The logic wa.~ simple enough, if you 
cannot prevent proliferation then control it. Further, the United State~ would control 
proliferation on its own terms with supranational (lAEA) legitimacy 
Japan's first reactor, constructed with funds from an Atoms for Peace grant, 
went critical in 1956. In essence, peaceful proliferation under the walchful supervision 
of the United State..~ and the IAIA enahled the evolution and indigenom development 
that has culminated in Japan's vit1uai (nuclear weapons) capahility today. This 
situation, however, is not unique to Japan. It is unique instead to the Atoms for Peace 
policy. India's peaceful explo~ion in 1974 indicated that a state could devdop a 
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nuclear bomb based solely on Atoms for Peace technology. (Imai and Rowan. 1980, 
p. 13) 
Japan was encouraged by the United States to develop nuclear energy. This is 
quite understandable. Japan is almost completely energy dependent. The postwar 
rec:onstruction and development were reliant upon an uninterrupted supply of energy. 
This was reinforced during the Suez crisis of 1956 and again with the OPEC embargo 
in 1973. Japan is committed to its civil nuclear program. It is similarly committed to 
plutonium reprocessing. Once a stare chooses the plutonium route, it becomes 
increasingly difficult to distinguish atoms for peace from atoms for war. There is no 
way to dismiss the dual-use potential of a plutonium stockpile. 
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III. 1969-1990: GRADUAL POLICY SHUTS 
A. NfXON -- "SHOCKS AND DOCTRINE" 
As conspicuou~Jy routine a.~ Japan policy was during the Kennedy and Jollll~on 
administrations, policy affecting Japan was the hallmark of the Nixon administration's 
foreign policy effort. The courtship of the People's Republic of rhina. the 
estahlishment of import quotas against Japanese synthetic textiles, and the United States 
abandoning the gold standard (and the resultant devaluation of the Japanese yen) were 
indeed · shocks' to Japanese-American relations. VvlJiie all three of these policy i.%ues 
were undertaken on behalf of the United States' interests. they were perceived in Japan 
as a lessening of the ItS. commitment to the United States-Japan relationship. 
Japan's perception of the opening of Communist China is understandable but 
wholly avoidable. The Japanese leadership had long desired a warming of the 
relationship between Washington and Beijing. The fact that Japan was oot informed of 
the secret negotiations distrcssed its leadership. Although U.S. policy toward the PRe 
had essentially nothing to do with Japan and everything to do with balancing against 
the Soviet Union, it was perceived in Tokyo, because of its announcement a~ a fait 
accompli, a~ a pos~ihle change of partnership in the Pacific. This need not have 
happened. Similarly, the intent of the ncw policy toward the PRC was intended to be 
independent and mutually exclusive of the existing relationship and security treaty with 
Japan. Unfortunately, Japanese perception of the event was founded in how it was 
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done rather than the re.~ult. Consequently, it probably produced the firs t questioning of 
the commitment of the United States coming to the aid of Japan militarily, "America's 
unilateral diplomacy, on an issue of such magnitude to Japan, needlessly embittered 
relations and increased the feeling that the United States was an unpredictable and 
untrustworthy ally. " (Neu, 1975, p. 225) 
Two long-standing irritations in United States-Japan policy were disposed of 
during the Nixon administration. The first, the reversion of Okinawa, wa~ considered 
by the Nixon administration as a magnanimous gesture from which could be extracted 
an economic quid pro quo. Unfortunately, the Japanese saw it as long overdue and in 
no way linked to the synthetic textile issue plaguing U.S. domestic politics. The other, 
the U.S. withdrawal from Southeast Asia, was a minor Japanese "victory" considering 
the companion concepts that had already become known as the Nixon Doctrine. 
Undoubtedly born of the Vietnam experience, the Nixon Doctrine was yet 
another signal that the United States could not and would not operate as the world 's 
policeman. Despite the firs t two of three principles, the essence of the doctrine was 
expressed by Nixon on 3 November 1%9: wOur intere.~t~ must shape our 
comm itments, rather than the other way around.' (Gaddis, 1982, p. 298) The first two 
principles were equally importam, however, they were overshadowed by the third as it 
hit much closer to home in those nations safely gathered under the U.S. security 
umbrella. Expressed in its initial form at a press conference 011 Guam in July 1969, 
President Nixon said: 
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First the United States will keep all of its treaty commitments 
Second, we shall provide a shield if a nuclear power threatens the 
freedom of a nation aBied with us or a nation we consider vital to our 
secunty. 
Third , ill cases involving other types of aggression, we shall furnish 
mil itary and economic assistance when requested in accordance with OUT 
treaty commitments. But we shall look 10 the nation directly threatened 
to assume the primary responsibility of providing manpower for its 
defense. (Gaddis, J982, p. 298) 
The burden shifting associated with the Nixon doctrine could indeed be 
interpreted as a lessening of the commitment of the United States 10 intervene on 
behalf of an al ly. 
As was discussed earlier, the Japanese Constitution prohib its the existence of 
offensive military forces but by their own interpretation it does not proh ibit the 
existence of defensive forces including nuclear weapons, If a nation-state telt its 
security was threatened, it may turn to self-help or alliance building_ Japan sought no 
other security alliances in 1969 after the U.S. policy shift that was articulated in the 
Nixon Doctrine. A recently released Japanese foreign Ministry report , however, 
indicates that Japan ' ... secretly decided in 1%9 to ensure it had the financial and 
technical potential to make nuclear arms without producing them." (Christian Science 
Monitor, 2 Aug 94, p. 6) The near-simultaneous nature of these two events, the Nixon 
pronouncement and the secret Japanese decision, is more than coincidental. 
Additionally, in the same news article originally printed in Ihe Mainichi ShimbUII, a 
Japanese daily, said " ... the ministry considered the 'potential' having been met." 
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(Christian Science Monitor, 2 Aug 94 , p. 6) Despite these revelations, the Japanese 
government under U.S . pressure, signed the Nuclear NonproHferation Treaty in 1970. 
B. QUESTIONING OVERSEAS COMMITMENTS: THE SYMINGTON 
HEARINGS 
Shortly after Nixon articulated the revised U.S. policy regarding commitments 
abroad, the Subcommittee on U.S. Security Agreements and Commitments abroad of 
the Senate Foreign Relations Committee met to discuss Japan and Okinawa. The 
Vietnam experience had as great an effect on the Senate as it had on the Chief 
Executive. For the first time, the Senate was questioning the very essence of the 
Mutual Security Treaty and commitments abroad. Senator Stuart Symington, himself a 
former member of the War Department and former Secretary of the Air Force, was 
chair of the subcommittee and opened the hearings on January 26, 1970, as follows: 
One observation before we start. It has been with considerable 
surprise J have noted the amount of apprehension created in .~ome 
quarters as the result of the efforts of this subcommittee to find out more 
about our policies , programs, and commitments with foreign COllntries 
with whom we are not at war, It is obvious we are having increasing 
difficulties at home, problems such as inadequate hOllsing, inadequate 
educational facilities, the growing and ever more obvious problem of 
water and air pollution. Everybody from the President down is facing 
up to the fact. as he did in his State of the Union message, that we may 
have to consider reorganizing our -- to use a hackneyed but nevertheless 
important word -- priorities with respect to our resources. (U .S, Senate 
Committee on Foreign Relations, 1970, p. 1149) 
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fhis very same plea could juSt as easily be heard today in a congressional 
hearing. Despite the premise and the intentions of the senators, thc Treaty and the 
military units a~signed to Japan have remained relatively unchanged after more than 
twenty-five years! In fact , the Pacific Command recommended the withdrawal of a 
squadron of IJSAF C-130 aircraft from Yokota Air Base in 1995. The squadron will 
remain in deference [0 Japanese desires. (Haley, 21 March 1995) 
Despite the relentless grilling by Senator J. W. Fulbright. it appears that the 
only real changes in Japan have resulted from the end of the Vietnam War that enabled 
the withdrawal of those units directly supporting the war, and an increase in hurden 
sharing by the Japanese. The Honorable U. Alexis Johnson, Under Secretary of State 
for Political Affairs, who received the lion's share of Fulbright's wrath, citcd North 
Korea as the reason for the U.S. presence in Japan. (U.S. Senate Committee on 
Foreign Relations, 1970, p. 1242) The more recent Boltom-Up review commissioncd 
hy the Clinton administration cited the same threat -- only now it is referred to as one 
of two possible "regional contingencies. ' Often the less tangible benefits of a treaty --
alihough more difficult to articulate and requiring the expenditure of more political 
capital -- are an end in themselves. Perhaps Mr. Johnson should have used 
' containment" rather than North Korea as his raison d'arc. Today the North Korean 
"regional contingency" is the justification for such a large presenct in Japan. Perhaps 
"regional stability" would he a more appropriate descriptor. fhis area will be 
examined more fully when the future of the relationship is considered below. 
23 
C. THE JAPANESE NUCLEAR PROGRAt\1 
1. Tbe Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty 
This section is a continuation of the Japan policy of thc Nixon administration. 
The Nuclear Nonproliferation Treaty (NPT) with its international reach warrants 
individual examination. The NIT, although international in scope and application, wa~ 
yet another attempt by the United States and its sister have states, commonly referred to 
as the ·original five," to perpetuate their nuclear advantage through an unequal treaty. 
If the Mainichi Shimbun report mentioned earlier is true, the NPT can claim partial 
credit as the Japanese seem to have decided to operaJe within the letter of the treaty --
stopping short of ' production" -- but not the spirit of the treaty -- the prohibition of 
weapons developmcnt beyond the 'original five.' The existence of "potential" is a far 
lesser evil than the possession of tested weapons and a survivable delivery capability) 
Japan's status as a virtual proliferator buys the United States and the international 
community time should Japan enter into a situation where capability would be more 
advantageous than potential. 
Although it took six years for the Diet to ratify the NPT, it is not clear that 
U.S. pressure caused any significant change in Japanese nuclear policy or Japanese-
1 Japan ha~ no long-range bombers, no in-flight refueling capabil ity. or ballistic missile 
submarines. Japan does, however, now have an indigenously developed. and 
successfully tested ballistic launch vehicle, NASDA's H-II. (Bulloch, March 1994. p. 
61-63), Additionall y, JMSDF ships carry cruise missiles that could be armed with 
nuclear warheads. 
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American relations . Early critics of U.S . pressure tactics foretold of emergent 
Japanese nationalism • ... driving the Japanese to embrace both oUl-and-oul anti-
Americanism and unilateral nuclear armament.· (Lawrence and Llrus, 1974, p. 204) 
Some have argued that the NPT has not stopped proliferation; they offer the Jraqi and 
the North Korean programs, among others, as proof. Others contend that the NPT ha.~ 
curbed proliferation significa ntly; they offer the pre-NPT estimates of twenty-plus 
NWS by 1995. Most agree, however. that NPT signatories are less likely to prol iferate 
-- thai the "Iraqi model" is the exception rather than the rule, Consideri ng what has 
been discusse<l thus far, the NPT has been a useful tool but not in itself an adequate 
stand-alone measure in the approach to Japanese nonproliferation. In conjunction with 
a credible security guarantee and cuntinued polit ical support of the three non-nuclear 
principles -- not to possess; not to manufacture; and not to introduce nuclear weapons. 
into Japan -- the N PT remains. an integral part of Japanese and United States' 
nonproliferation policy. 
Although the Japanese signed the NPT in 1970 and ratified it in 1976, these acts 
were independent of the l;(m~t itutiona l it y issue regarding the existence of Japanese 
nuclear weapons. While a signatory to an instrument of international law, the internal 
policy expressed a contrary view. The constitutionality debate began in 1955 and 
continuet! until 1973 when Prime Min ister Tanaka said he would not rule out the 
possibility of lapan devcloping defensive nuclear weapons. A policy paper prepared by 
the LDP's Security Research Council echoed the same pOSition four months later. 
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(Reiss , 1988, p. 121) In essence. it was decided that • .. . there wa~ no need to undergo 
the arduou~ process of constitutional revision if Japan decide<! to acquire nuclear 
weapons" (Reiss. 1988, p. 121) as defensive nuclear weapons were not inherently 
unconstitutional. 
2. Tbe Carter Nuclear Policy 
Just as Atoms for Peace opened the U.S. nuclear "black box~ for peaceful 
exploitation by our allies. the Carter nuclear policy attempted to put the cOrk back in 
the bottle after the "peaceful" plutonium genie had set up nuclear housekeeping in 
several new locations. In April 1977, President Carter made a major policy 
announcement which questioned the wisdom of plutonium use and reprocessing. 
Further. he called for an international nuclear fuel evaluation for the purpose of 
curbing the spread of nuclear weapons. The objective was not to deprive Japan of its 
civilian nuclear power capability but rather to prevent nuclear proliferation in the 
developing world. Unfortunately, the policy created extreme likelihood of some 
measure of the former with no corresponding guarantee of the latter. In sum, the 
policy was a reversal of previous policy (inter alia, Atoms for Peace and the 1958 
Agreement for Cooperation for the supply of nuclear material~ and technology) and 
caused a great deal of concern in Japan. 
Most obvious, any reversal of policy, especially one upon which many future 
plans and assumptions were based. strains and weakens existing agreements while 
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similarly hampering future negotiations. This sudden shift in U.S. pol icy was seen as a 
dual threat. Not surpr isingly, it was seen as a di rect threat to the investment al ready 
made in breeder reactor technology. Addi tionally , those politicians who supported 
breeder technology and 'sold " it to the wary Japanese public -- the only public ever 
subjected to the devastating effect~ of an atomic bomb -- had sacrificed political capital 
impossible to recoup should the plutonium "rug" be jerked from beneath them. 
Consequently. the Japanese government proceeded with plans to begin operation of the 
French-designed Tokai-Mura reprocessing plant. Under existing agreement, Japan had 
10 gain approval of the United States in order to reprocess nuclear fue l of U.S. origin. 
This put President Carter in a rather difficult situation. The plant had been built with 
U.S . encouragement under a previous administrat ion aml policy. Granting an 
exemption to the new policy would have most assuredly undermined the overriding 
premise of the Caner Policy -- nonproliferation through the control of plutonium. It 
would have damage<! U.S . credibility in the global arena as well by setting a precedent 
that ran contrary to the long-standing nonproliferation principle as well as the new 
policy of a recently inaugurated administration. The loggerhead confrontation was 
resolved by a compromise that basically acquiesced to Japanese desi res. A temporary 
(renewable) agreement was executed between the United States and Japan. Constraint,> 
consistent with the Carter approach to non-proliferation were placed upon the Japanese. 
Specifically, for the two year period the Japanese would not, (1) use plutonium in 
commercial light-water reactors, (2) construct a convers ion (plutonium nitrate to 
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plutonium oxide) facility, and (3) build a second commercial-scale reprocessing 
facility. (Yager, 1980, p. 29) This was more a posturing event for the interoational 
forum than it was an operative policy since the Japanese had no desire to undertake the 
mcasure.~ prevented by the first and third conditions during thaI two year period 
covered. Condition number two provided significant inconvenience. They needed 
plutonium oxide (a solid) for their reactor development programs and tanks would have 
to be built for the storage of increased quantities of plutonium nitrate (a liquid). 
(Yager, 1980, p.29) In return for accepting these temporary constraints on enrichment 
and plutonium use, they could proceed with the operation of the Tokai-Mura facility . 
Simply put, pragmatism overrode principle as me driver of U.S. policy . 
Other Carter administration policies were viewed in a negative light by the 
Japanese government and nuclear power establishment including the administration's 
support for the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Act of 1978. The principal element of this 
act required that the Unite<:! States approve the etuichment of U.S.-supplied nuclear 
material. The Japanese saw this as an attempt to block the development of Japanese 
enrichment facilities. In its attempts to control, the United States was hindering the 
very processes that the Japanese government thought would be resolved upon accession 
to the NPT. It is indeed ironic rhat the Carter Nuclear Policy in its attempts to limit 
the spread of nuclear weapons through technical fixes rather than pol itical and 
diplomatic methods provided instead a powerful incentive for nuclear self-sufficiency. 
Additionally , 
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What they (the Japanese) fclt they were faced with was a sudden and 
overnight reversal in major U.S . policy. Whatever the basic intention of 
the U.S. policy makers may have been, an impression was created that 
the country was no longer a credible partner in any international 
dealings. (Imai, 1979, p. 73) 
Ronald Reagan realized the same thing as Jmai Ryukichi. Reagan also understood the 
importance of the United States-Japan relationship. 
3. The Reagan Revenals 
While not reversing the country's commitment to nonproliferation, President 
Reagan reversed some of the elements of the Carter policy which the Japanese found 
most undesirable. On 16 July 1981, President Reagan staled: 
We must reestablish this nation as a predictable and reliable partner for 
peaceful nuclear cooperation under adequate safeguards. This is essent ial 
to our nonproliferation goals. If we are not such a partner, other 
countries will go their own ways and our influence will diminish. This 
would reduce our effectiveness in gaining the support we need to deal 
with proliferation prohlem.~. The Adminis tration will also not inhibit or 
set back civil reprocessing and breeder reactor development abroad in 
nations with advanced nuclear power programs where it does not 
constitute a proliferation risk. (House Committee on roreign Affairs, 
1988, pp. 566-7) 
As is clear in the above quotation, the articulated blanket policy of the previous 
administration had heen rolled back in favor of a case-by-case approach based upon the 
risk of proliferat ion. In reality, the compromises of the Carter administration and the 
articulated policy of the Reagan administration were more similar than they were 
different. From a Japanese perspective. however. the 'new· policy was welcomed 
29 
with open arms. In this case, the policy achieved its intended result -- improved 
relations with a longtime ally that livoo on the doorstep of the 'Evil Empire." 
D. REAGAN'S POLICY OF ENCOURAGEMENT 
Along with his commitment to Japan'.~ civil nuclear power program, President 
Reagan while building-up U.S. conventional forces, sought a similar modernization and 
expansion on the part of the lSDF. As the Soviet Union continued to expand and 
modernize its armoo forces, the United States continuoo to rely upon the United States-
Japan Security Treaty to balance the Soviet forces in the Far East. Japan was well 
aware of its vulnerability to Soviet aggression. Countless Japanese "White Papers" 
drafted during the Cold War ar ticu lated the Soviet threa.t. As late as the 1993 White 
Paper , the capability of Russian forces in the Far F_ast was considered "virtualJy 
unchangoo from previous editions" of White Papers. (Brown, May 1994, p. 433) 
Although the second paragraph of Article IX of the Japanese con.~titution prohibits 
standing military forces of any kind, modifications in subsequent legislation and 
"interpretations" have enabled the creation of a highly capable Self-Difense Force. 
During the 1980's, a joint effort to "integrate" U.S. and Japanese (Self-Defense) forces 
began. Japanese Mari time Self-Defense Forces. while incapable of power prOJection, 
would be complementary assets in an overa!! strategy of sea control. The JMSDF's 
anti-submarine warfare capabilities would be integrated into the joint battle force 
allowing the U.S. to concentrate on power projection. Despite the capability of the 
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Self-Defense Forces, Japan has not yet entered the self-reliance mode. It has not 
needed to. It can continue to rest (though not so comfonably as before) under the 
nuclear umbrella and behind the conventional shield of the United States so long as the 
Mutual Security Treaty endures. 
Nevertheless, President Reagan encouraged the Japanese government to increase 
its share of the burden for the defense of Japan. While the increase in rcal expenditures 
for the SOF was a token one-tenth of one percent (of GOP) , the Japanese provide 
nearly complete suppOrt for all U.S. forces permanently stationed in Japan. 
Additionally, the JMSDF possess the most capable and modern "navy" in Ea.~t Asia. 
With new attack submarines, Aegis destroyers, and the latest variant of the P-3 long-
range maritime patrol aircraft, Japan is much closer to its goal of protecting a "1,000 
NM marit ime defense zone" proclaimed by Prime Minister Suzuki in 1981 (as 
encouraged by President Reagan). (Kawamura, May 1994, p. 1.) Nevertheless, the 
SDF despite expansion and modernization still has no aerial hombardment (long range) 
or refueling capabilities, and no maritime power projection capabllit)' . Even if the 
constitution was amended to allow offensive weapons, it would be a long time hefore 
the capability came to fru ition. The Japanese procurement process is even more 
restrictive, costly, and cumbersome than that of the United States. Additionally , 
weapons lIJust be buill or co-produced (usually under license from foreign 
manufacturers) in Japan and cannot be imported. Of course, a political decision could 
abol ish these impediments but that is unlikely in the absence of an immed iate threat and 
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even with the Social Democratic Party having a voice in the coalition governments. 
Similarly, the unwritten policy guideline that limits Japanese defense spending to one 
percent of GDP would have to be ignored as it has been it the past. 
E. RESURGENT JAPAt'ffiSE NATIONALISM 
"These were days of high emotion in Tokyo -- one young man said it reminded 
him of the time of the 8-29 raids -- so tense was the atmosphere." (Packard, 1966, p. 
252) Leftist forces, primarily the Japan Socialist Party3 and the Shohyo (General 
Council of Trade Unions), were mobilizing support against revision of the treaty. The 
revised treaty had been signed in November of the previous year, 1959. President 
Eisenhower was scheduled to visit Japan in June. Prime Minister Kishi and his LDP 
government desired that the Diet ratify the new trcaty prior to Eisenhower's visit. The 
fervor, however, required a cancellation of Eisenhower's visit. Kishi called in the 
police -- a force of 12,(X)() in and around the Diet -- to quell the dissent prior to the 
critical vote on 18 June. When the LDP railroaded the revised Security Treaty through 
the government with a simple majority vote, however, the calm prevailed. The 
preceding riots and demonstrations focusing on Japanese nationalism ultimately brought 
down a government as Kishi resigned on 23 June 1960. For the succeeding two 
decades, however, the nationalistic fervor went into hibernation. 'With the treaty 
3 While this is the direct translation from Japanese, the party reterred to itself as the 
Social Democratic Party. It should not be confused with the Democratic Socialist 
Party, a faction which split from the JSP in 1959. 
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ratified amI Kishi's resignation plans announced , the inflamed puhlic mood shifted 
abruptly from outrage (0 apathy.' (Packard, 1966, p. ](3) 
A hyproduct of Japanese economic success was a resurgence of pride and 
nationalism in the 1980's. The leaders of this reform movement. Ishihara Shintaro. 
Eta Jun, and Shimizu lkataro, attacked the Yoshida doctrine as well as the Japanese 
constitution. (Pyle, 1992, pp. 58-59) In 1980 Eto wrote in J946-nen kempo: SOliD 
knsoku: 
If there were among the American people the determination to wipe 
away completely their distrust of Japan, to tolerate a more powerful and 
less dependent Japan, and to form an alliance with and coexist with such 
a Japan, the [ulliTe of Japan-U.S. relations would be bright. (Pyle, 
1992, p. 59) 
During thaI same time, Shimizu was advocating stronger, and more specific 
measures for Japan. He said. 
If Japan acquired military power commensurate with its economIC 
power, countries that fully appreciate the meaning of military power 
would not overlook th is. They would defer; they would act with 
caution; and in time, they would show res~t. (Pyle 1992, p. 60) 
In reality, Shimizu was advocating that Japan needed to "exercise [he nuclear 
option" in order for it to be taken seriously. (Pyle, 1992, p. 61) Fortunately for the 
Japanese and the international system, the nationalistic rhetoric of the 1980's caught 
neither the popular support of the 1960 experience nor thc mobilization of the society , 
33 
as happened in the \930's. While the reasons for this are complex and varied, twO in 
particular should be noted. First, the economic strength which would facilitate an 
independent, rearmed Japan is and was inextricably tied to a political-economic 
interdependence which in itself would preclude offensive rearmament. Additionally, 
the LOP was still firmly in control of the government. The LOP was committed to 
maintenance of the status quo which included preservation of the relationship with the 
United States as well as continued economic growth . This analysis has already 
demonstrated that these two elements of the LOP platform go hand in hand . finally , 
despite the Foreign Ministry's revelation regarding a secret nuclear weapons program4. 
the antinuclear policy of the day echoed that previously articulated by Prime Minister 
Sato in a speech to the Oiet on 30 January 1968. He advocated (I) only peaceful uses 
of atomic energy; (2) the promotion of nuclear disarmament; (3) adherence to the three 
non-nuclear principles; and reliance upon the nuclear security guarantee of the United 
Slates. (Reiss, 1988, p. 118) 
F. THE END OF AN ERA AND PARADIGM: THE COLLAPSE OF THE 
SOVIET UNION 
The collapse of the Soviet Union and its supporting infrastructure of buffer 
states, proxies , and security alliances, is the beginning of the next incarnation of the 
United States-Japan relationship. While one might assume that an institution stripped 
4 Refer to Chapter 1lI, Section A. 
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of the reason for which it was created would be an inevitable casualty analogous to the 
fate of a parasitic organism when it~ host dies. The collapse of the Soviet Union at the 
beginning of this decade was indeed a watcrshC<! event with global implications. 
Nevertheless, little has changed regarding the alliance structure that originated with 
NSC-68. Seven such relationships still exist despite the disappearance of the original 
raison d'€tre -- the Communist threat. The United States has significant security 
relationships with NATO, the Republic of Korea, Thailand, the Republic of the 
Philippines, and Australia as well as Japan. While Asian stability benefits from the 
holdover of these Cold War alliances, an overarching pol icy appc.trs so far to be absent 
from the Amcrita.n agenda. Of these relationships, the only one that retains it~ 
relevance as originally conceived is the arrangement with the Republic of Korea. Of 
the two old-line, isolationist Communist regimes, one shares a border with our ally, the 
Republic of Korea. The Prime Minister of the Republic of Korea recently said that. 
I "the Cold War is over except on the Korean peninsula." (Lee. 13 April 1995) 
Post-Cold War studies have attempted to identify the force structure needed in 
the absence of the Soviet threat. The Bush administration crafted the Base Force 
Concept which was subsequently revised downward by the Clinton administration's 
Bottom-Up Review . While these studies have established goals for current and future 
force levels, the jikelih{xxl uf having tu undertake a contingency operalion in support of 
our Cold War-based formal alliances is indeed remote with the exception of Korea. In 
place of the threat pose<! by the Soviet Union and Warsaw Pact. force levels are now 
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predicated on the ability to wage two "nearly-simultaneous , regional contingencies." 
The identified "threat~" associate<! with these regional contingencie..~ are the Democratic 
Peoples Republic of Korea and Iraq. While the North Korean contingency is similar to 
what was envisioned when the Soviet Union still supported client states, the remaining 
bilateral relationships in Asia have ~eemingly lo~t their relevance. A similar argument 
could be made for continuing support of NATO. 
In the case of Japan, the rationale (other than our treaty obligation) for 
continued U.S. presence is to support the Korean regional contingency. Accordingly, 
when the Korean contingency is no longer a valid assumption in the force level 
calculus, the U.S. forces in Japan become "excess' and therefore are expendable. As 
Dr. Gordon Adams of the Officer of Management and Budget said, "if you lose the 
Korean contingency, you will lose fifty percent of your operating forces." (Adams, 18 
April 1995) The nee<! for a successor policy to conTainment is necessary. Force levels 
and capabiliiies should be driven by sound policy derive<! directly from national 
interest. As circumstances change, as has happened with the end of the Cold War, 
policy must change to reflect the current circumstances. The regional contingency 
concept reflects the war last fought and the only remaining Cold War foe thai maintains 
a viable force. 
The paradigm that supporttXI U.S. policy and strategy since 1950 losl its 
relevancy over five years ago. Yet the status quo of U.S. commitments remains titXI to 
that paradigm. A new paradigm, "Engagement and Enlargement," has heen offered by 
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the Clinton administration as a replacement for containment. Unfortunately, the 
Engagement and Enlargement strategy lacks both the consistency and identifiable 
threat that made containment a quintessential foundation for the development of policy 
and strategy. While it was undoubtedly ea.sier to plan in a hipolar world , the 
fundamental U.S. interests -- the security and the prosperity of its citizens -- have nm 
changed with the end of the Cold War. 
As was demonstrated earlier, the United States-Japan relationship was ahl e to 
successfully bridge the paradigmatic shift from the "victor and vanquished" relationship 
to that of Cold War allies. Similarly, there is no reason to think that the same two 
eounrries, that are now "economic Siamese twins," will be unable to transition from 
Cold War allies to partners for Asian stability. 
J7 
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IV. 1991-PRESENT: THE GUU- WAR AS A TOUCHSTONE 
If the end of the Cold War signaled the end of the paradigm upon which the 
nation-states of the world relied for decision-making and policy formation , the Gulf 
War, 10 an even greater extent, brought home to Japan just how ill-equ ipped the 
government was regarding participation in international rdations. Despite immense 
economic power, the {lOli/ieal dormancy resulting from adherence to the Yoshida 
Doctrine, rendered Japan vinually useless except as a financier of the American-led 
coalition. rhis, however, was not uniquely Japanese. Germany, like Japan, a defeatW 
nation of World War II, wa.~ handcuffed by like constraints and consequently played a 
role similar to Japan's during the Gulf War. The similarity of these twO countries stops 
here. Germany is a regional power and the leading European member of ooth the 
European Union and NATO. Japan on the other hand, has relied upon its economic 
power through direct oversea~ invcstment and developmental assistance as its primary 
instruments of foreign influence and glohal intercourse. The Gulf War, more than any 
other single event, showed the Japanese just how incomplete their system and chosen 
methodologies were when trying to participate in a global crisis. 
A. DISAPPOll\'TME.NT WITH JAPAN'S RESJ>ONSE 
·Prior to the crisis, policy coordination between Japan and the United States on 
a range of other issues had been making good progress. America therefore expecte<! 
39 
Japan to stand with it against Saddam. Japan betrayed that expectation." (07.awa, 
1994, pp. 36-37) Overall, the non-financial support provided for the Gulf War can be 
best characterized as "tOO little to late.· Aware of the constitutional restraints, the 
requests made by the United States focused on support rather than combat assistance. 
Specifically, the United States requested sealift, airlift, and minesweeping support from 
the Japanese. None of these three services were provided when requested nor were 
they eventually provided in the manner or to the level requested. Japanese military 
ships would not he u.~ed. Of the three merchant ships dispatched over a month after the 
request, one flew the American flag. The airlift was provided by an American airline 
under contract paid for with Japanese money. JMSDF minesweepers were sent after 
the war was over. "Japan's response came too late; we were unable to cooperate when 
we were really needed." (Ozawa, 1994, p. 37) Needless to say the war was won 
without Japanese military support. Three of the remaining bilateral alliance partners in 
East Asia, the Philippines, the Republ ic of Korea, and Australia, provided military 
personnel to the coalition. While these contributions were small when compared to the 
13 billion dollars ultimately provided by Japan, the pOlitical and social impacts in Japan 
have manifest themselves in, among other things, legislation which allows overseas 
deployment of JSDF personnel in support of United Nations' peacekeeping operations. 
Since this legislation was passed by the Diet in 1992. JSDF personnel have been 
deployed to Camborlia and Rwanda. Probably the greater impact. however, has been 
the calls for radical change such as those of Ozawa Ichiro. The former secretary-
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general of the Liberal Democratic Party and co-founder of the Japan Renewal Party 
advocates "normal nation" status for the future of Japan in his powerful strategic vision 
entitled Bluepn"nt for a New Japan. Whi le the seeds for change exist, Ozawa admits 
that impediments to change exist as well. 
B. JAPANESE CHANGE: SEEDS AI'I'D lMPEDDfENTS 
The immediate post-Gulf War environment saw the seeds of change as well as 
another resurgence of Japanese nationalism. Similarly during that same period, the 
Liberal Democratic Party (LOP) fell from a position of power that had been 
unchallenged for ncarly fifty years. The comhination of these conditions have resulted 
in the formation of coalition governments that have out of necessity concentrated on 
domestic issues in order to maintain popular support. While the Socialists have for 
now abandoned their blanket opposition to the United States-Japan security treaty , the 
seeds of change lie dormant -- suppressed hy internal polit ical turmoil and domestic 
preoccupation. Change in Japan is thwarltd by several additional factors which include 
the success of the Yoshida Doctrine, the decision-by-consensus process , and the 
sanctity of the constitution. While these factors may nO! appear insurmountable, they 
present a formidable challenge for potential reform. Nearly five decades of deference 10 
the United States and avoidancc of participation in glohal politics have created a 
situation for whieh both countries must now pay the penalty. lapan must learn to 
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participate in international affairs, which it formerly avoided, and the United Slates 
must accept lesser dcference and growing autonomy in Japanese foreign policy. 
Ozawa hclieves that while Japan is an economic and technological power. it is 
politically weak. Japan's eonduct prior to and during the Gulf War brought this 
weakness to the attention of the Japanese populace as well as the international 
community. This political weakness and a lack of experience in the international 
political arena arc at the roo! of Japan's isolationist tendency. Ozawa sees several areas 
in which Japan must expand and reform politically before it will be able to take its 
place among the nOmull nations of the international community: 
The government must replace the private sector (corporations) as the 
national leader; 
Japan must define it.~ national interests; 
Japan ean no longer ignore foreign relations; 
Japan must accept the concept that in some cases foreign policy may have 
to supersede domestic concerns; 
Japan must recognize that unanimous Diet aceord in decision-making is 
crippling and begin the necessary process of modification; 
Japan must reorganize the Primc Minister's Official Residence to eliminate 
the structural causes of ·weak leadership;· 
The governmcnt must be restructured so that "overall coordination" becomes 
possible. (Ozawa, 1994, pp. 39-45) 
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Obviously, the list above is consistent with the title of the book , A Blueprint for 
a NeIV Japan. These measures and reforms must take plal:e in Japan; the United Statc.~ 
can do little to assist. A stable relationship betwccn the two countries, however, should 
make it easier for Japan to init iate internal change. A commitment on the part of the 
United States to a revised relationship with a Japan more actively engage{) in global 
affairs would also ease the pain of transition. 
C. NO NEW PARADIGM, JUST NEW EMPIHSIS 
In the absence of a common threat, the cynosure of the United States-Japan 
relatiomhip has shifted from security to trade. Seldom d0e5 a day pass without a media 
report about Japanese trade practices and the consequent dissatisfaction in the United 
States. Simi larly, bOlh sides nearly always caveat the details with a statement regarding 
the importance of and the continuing commitment to the security relatioruhip. [f the 
twO were not linked, however,the security relation.~hip would not be di.~cussed in 
conjunction with the economic relationship. Neither diplomats nor negotiators operate 
in a vacuum. Antagonisms in one context, trade for example, an~ neither forgotten nor 
dismissed when dealing in the political or security arenas. This opinion was recently 
supported in a commentary by Japan-watcher and editor of The Atlantic Monthly, 
James fallows. He said, "Japan will have to choose between it~ economic policy and 
the military tie to the Unite<! States." (Fallows , 23 May 1995, NPR) Consequently, it 
behooves both the United States and Japan to minimize the confrontations associated 
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with trade for the greater good of the overall relationship. The overriding concerns of 
the Cold War provided this dampening effect. As the economic theories and practices 
of the two countries are so different. searching for a unique approach hy which hath 
countries could trade under the most favorable circumstances is probahly better than 
attempting to realign systems that are inseparable from the societies that crealed them) 
Using the "current account" as a measure of the United States-Japan relationship is 
distorting and counterproductive. It does not take into account direct investment or 
government and commercial paper held by the Japanese. Admittedly, the trade 
imbalance provides a graphic illustration of a problem which can be universally 
embraced in the United States. The fact remains, however, that the United States and 
Japan have established an economic imerdependence that mandates a perpetuation of 
economic intercourse. Should hath countries continue with their limited compromise 
stances with regard 10 trade reform, it is possible that a negative, spiraling trend could 
develop. Without a military threat on their doorstep, the Japanese can play hardhal l in 
the trade negotiations. 
5 The purpose and scope of this thesis preclude adequate analysis of this generalization, 
but to say that hoth economies are capitalist would be an oversimplification and 
misrepresentation . The Japanese pursue protectionist policies in their importing as well 
as in their internal distribution system. Japanese society favors saving over 
consumption. American society emphasizes consumption rather than savings. It is not 
likely that a compromise will enable the blending of such divergent practices. Simply 
put, a common approach to economic style and practice is equally unlikely. 
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L Trade Wars 
Ouring the same time frame that included the break-up of the Soviet Union and 
the inva~ion of Kuwai t, the lJnited States and Japan engaged in a round of bilatcral 
tradc talks known a..~ thc Structural Impediment') Initiative (SIl). The premise, implicxl 
ahovc in footnote 5 , upon which the talks were based. dealt with the 'structural" 
differences of the competing economic and social systems that were believed to be at 
the center of the trade imbalance between the two countries. At the conclusion of the 
talks, both countries agreed to major structural changes. The Japanese agrecxl !O a 
normalization of the preferential treatment of farmers and small shopkeepers who had 
long been over-represented in t.he governments of the Liberal Democratic Party. The 
convoluted, most. probably COlTUPt., and definitely highly protectionist commodities 
distribution system is a manifestation of this over-representation. This condition, while 
not unique to Japan, has been a major impediment to U.S. imports. Specifically, U.S. 
products are not competitive in the Japanese market under the constraints imposed by 
the distribution system. Inefficient Japanese farmers as well as "mom-and-pop" 
businesses, however, remain intact due to the existing protections. To illustrate this in 
another way, Japanesc products arc cheaper in New York than thcy are in Japan. Not 
only do the U.S. companies suffer, the Japanese consumers suffer as weI!. 
The United States agreed to reduce the federal budget (an implication [or 
reducing the national debt while IKJt specifically stated) , increase federal support of 
research and development, and a requirement for adopting the metric system for federal 
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procurements beginning in 1993 . At the time, the Sli was touted as a highly 
significant breakthrough in United States-Japan trade negotiations . The tangible 
results, however, have been overtaken by subsequent events -- the United States-Japan 
trade imbalance reached a record high in the spring of 1995 and over half of the 
imbalance can be attributed to automobile sales. (Smith, 17 May 1995, pp. IA and 
9A) Perhaps Sato Ryuw was correct when he said, • ... 1 do not believe the Structural 
Impetliments Initiative talks produce<! any significant results .. . ," however, he was 
equally wrong to assume that, " ... they have somewhat relieved the tension between the 
two countries. ' (Sato, 1994, p. 19) Any relief was short lived. 
As a result of the fai lure to reach accord in the latest round of trade talks, the 
Clinton administration announced its intention to place 100 percent tariffs on thirteen 
Japanese luxury cars. This policy will be enacted on 28 June 1995 should Japanese 
concessions not be forthcoming. The punitive tariffs soon to he enacted against Japan 
may now have universal support at home. The fallout and side effects from such action 
may, however, be contrary to U,S. national interest. Japan intends to seek relief 
through the World Trade Organization. U.S. Commerce Secretary Ron Brown said 
that the United States would abide by the wro decision. Avoiding continued talks 
with the United States in favor of third party arbitration is a step backward rather than 
forward. It appears that a.~ of 23 May 1995, the Japanese are willing to resume talks in 
search of a resolution. 
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A "healThy · trade relationship between the United Slates and Japan is in the 
national interest of both countries . Continuing dialogue and mutual concessions are a 
better approach than what is happening at the present. Con!iCquently , a new approach 
to the resolution of trade cunfliets is required. (Extremely) marginal U.S. gains have 
been made in the areas of apple, rice, cellular telephone and flat glass exports to Japan. 
It al.~o appcan that other aspects uf current U.S. reform -- federal hudge! reduction 
debt reduction, and personal savings incentives -- are consistent with both domestic and 
Japanese desires regarding the future direction of the U.S. economy. The planned 
punitive tariffs will only affect what. amounted to 1.4 percent of Japanese automobile 
sales in the United States for 1994. (Smith, 17 May 1995, p. lA) Assuming similar 
sales for 1995, this is more of a symbolic than functional gesture Hopefully it will 
have the desired effect of resumed negotiations rather than the cascading effect of 
retaliation. 
I D, JAPANESE NUCLEAR PROGRAM TODAY 
L Articulated Policy, Then and Now 
On 11 May 1995, lapan joined with over 170 nations including the United 
States to extend the Nuelear Nonproliferation Treaty permanently. This should IKJl 
ha\' c come as a surprise, however, it is a reversal of the previously articulated 
position. At the Group of Seven (G-7) summit meeting in Tokyo in July 1993, 
" .,Japanese officials refused to put iheir government un record as endorsing an 
47 
indefinite extension of the Non-Proliferation Treaty." (Mann and Helm, 9 July 1993, 
p. \) While the United States had been pushing Japan to endorse an indefinite 
extension, talks had bogged down in the spring as concerns regarding North Korea's 
nascent nuclear program intensified. Additionally, Japanese officials expressed 
opinions consistent with many other nuclear "have-not" nations regarding the lack of 
commitment to disarmament demonstrated thus far by the nuclear "have" nations 
While technical assessments6 and the previously cited Mainichi Shimbun report 
regarding Japan's ability to assemble nuclear weapons on short notice strongly support 
the existence of Japan's virtual nuclear capability, recent policy articulated by both the 
Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, as well as the Prime Minister. 
stressed Japan's commitment to disarmament and non-proliferation. 
At the 49th session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, Kono 
Yohei, Deputy Prime Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs, said the following, 
Japan .~trives to achieve the ultimate goal of eliminating all nuclear 
weapons .. ,Japan supports the indefinite extension of the Nuclear Non-
proliferation Treaty and calls on all States that have not acceded to the 
treaty to do so at the earliest opportunity. (Permanent Mission of Japan 
to the UN, 27 September 1994, p. 3) 
6 While the scope of this thesis precludes technical analysis of Japan's nuclear weapons 
capability, the extensive open source li terature not limited to but including the 
fo!lowing attests to the fact that Japan has develope<! the infrastructure and industrial 
capability required of a mature nuclear weapons state. See Endicott, 1975, p. 132; 
Epstein, 1976, p. 238; Hayes, 28 February 1993, p. 7; May, Winter 93/94, p. l85; 
and Reiss, 1988, p. 116. 
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Similarly, h~ also call~d for an early and successful conclusion of the Comprehensive 
Test Ban Treaty and invited the potential signatories to Hiroshima for the signing 
ceremony. 
The Prime Minister, Murayama Tomiichi, echoed nearly the same sentimcnt~ in 
his speech to the l32nd Diet session on 20 January 1995. He called for disarmament, 
an indefinite extenSKlll of the Nonproliferation Treaty, and a comprehensive tc~t han 
(Japan Times, 21 January 1995, p. 4) As has been the case since the~' were first 
articulated in 1967, both officials reaffirmed their commitment to the "three non-
nuclear principles" while reminding their audiences of ule "nuclear allergy' acquired 
hy the only country to be the victim of atomic weapons. 
Despite the encouraging rhetoric, when Japan was confronted with North 
Korea's nuclear program. Japanese nuclear weapons emerged as a future p{)s~ihility. It 
was not until after assurances by the United States and the beginning of negotiations 
between the United States and North Korea to halt the Korean program that the 
Japanese agreed to support an indefinite extension of the Nonproliferation Treaty. As 
addressed ahove, the Japanese decided in 1973 after an eighteen-year debate that 
difensive nuclear weap<JIl~ were not unconstitutional. (Reiss, 1988, pp. 120-122) This 
policy , however, wa~ developed and endorsed by the LDP which is no longer in 
power. Subsequent reinterpretations of the Japanese constitution may reinforce the 
currently articulated non-nuclear policy. It should he noted that it wa~ a LDP 
government Ulat formulated the three non-nuclear principles as well as the "nuclear 
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aJlergy~ syndrome at the same time the constitutionality debate was raging. Now a 
Socialist Prime Minister is advocating a LDP-formulated policy. Could he not also 
ascribe to other policies developed by the LDP? 
2. Japan and Plutonium 
Japan is committed to becoming more involved in the international community. 
The criticism it has received from Greenpeace and other state and non-state entities 
regarding the stockpil ing and transportation of plutonium is hard ly the type of 
involvement or publicity that was envisioned. Nevertheless, environmental groups both 
domestic and international as well as the media have focused on this issue. It also 
merits examination within the context of this thesis. 
While there are many other complex factors involved, obtaining suitable 
nuclear explosive material is probably the most difficult part of the 
development of at least elementary fission weapons . Of the two 
important nuclear explosives, uranium-235 and plutonium-239 , probably 
only plutonium will be commonly available in the civilian nuclear 
economy in relatively pure form .. .. The slightly enriched uranium (about 
2-4 percent uranium-235) is not usable for nuclear weapons but the 
plutonium is usable. (Gilinsky, March 1967, p. 1) 
It is estimated that Japan will have a plutonium stockpile of 43.3 tons by the 
year 2000 and 100 tons by 2010. (Hayes, 28 February 1993, p. 6.) From the time 
Japan began reprocessing until 1990, 1.9 tons more plutonium were separated than 
util i7.eU. (Hayes, 28 February 1993, Table 1) A nuclear wcapon requires five to tcn 
kilograms of plutonium. (Schlesinger, March 1967, p. 13 and Imai, 1979, p. 77) 
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Utilizing these estimates and assuming 99 percent accuracy of IAEA accounting, Japan 
had enough fissile material to produce one to three weapons hy 1 Y90 and could possibly 
produce over 40 by the turn of the century. There appears to be no definitive open 
source evidence beyond what has already been presented to otherwise support the 
hypothesis of Japanese vinual nuclear weapons capahility. When all factors __ 
technology, infrastructure, financing, availability of fissile material , and internal policy 
decisions -- arc taken into account, however, a very strong circumstantial argument is 
created to support the viahility of this hypothesis. 
E. TRENDS AND OBSERVATIONS 
1. Com'ergente 
The post-GUlf War world has witnessed a convergence of both capability and 
intention regarding the roles of the United States and Japan in the international 
commUlllly. At the same time the United States was redefining its policy on 
intervention and participation in United Natiom' military operations, Japan was 
debating participation in United Nations' Peacekeeping Operations. In 1992, the Diet 
passed legislation which enables the overseas dispatch of JSDF personnel. As a result 
of military intervention failures in Somalia, the United States has been hesitant to take 
the lead in the Balkan and African conflicts. On 6 February 1995, the I04th Congress 
passed bill number H.R. 7, The National Security Revitalization Act/NATO 
Revitalization and Jixpamion Act of 1995, that severely restricts both participation in 
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and funding of Unite(j Nations' Peacekeeping Operations. (H .R. 7, Titles IV and V) 
Prior to that, former SecreLarY of Defense Caspar Weinberger developed a conditional 
check-list for the deployment of U.S. forces in support of United Nations operatioll.';. 
Despite President Clinton's pre-election rhetoric wh ich ran contrary to Weinberger's 
"litmus test," both the President and the Congress arc now leaning toward a more 
conservative approach to how U.S. forces are employe{) when the United Slates and its 
interests (including allies) arc not directly threatened. Conversely, Japanese forces 
have been deployed overseas in support of UN operations in Cambodia, Mozambique, 
and Rwanda. Similarly, U.S. official developmental assistance (foreign aid) has been 
decreasing to an all-time low at the same time lapanese official developmental 
assistance has grown to exceed all other nations. (Zhou, April 1991, p. 341) While 
the vast majority of U.S. developmental assistance goes to two countries, Israel and 
Egypt, Japanese aid and the commensurate influence is flowing into Africa, Europe, 
Latin America, the Caribbean, Middle East and other Asian nations. (Akaha, April 
1991, p. 333 and Lincoln, 1993, p. 109-133) 
In return for these contributions to arrest the problems of "all humankind,· 
Japan is pressing for a permanent seat on the UN Security Council. Deputy Prime 
Minister and Minister of Foreign Affairs expressed this very notion in his address to 
the 49th session of the UN General Assembly in September 1994. (Permanent Mission 
of Japan to the United Nations, 27 September 1994, p. 9) 
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Japan is taking steps tu broaden its global influence. Wh ile this will continue to 
be a slow and deliberate process, it is an operative process that is consistent with the 
economic strength and interdependence that now characu:rize Jaran. Despite the 
current U.S. National Security Strategy of "Engagement and EnlargemenL" the reality 
of ever decreasing federal budgets throughout the foreseeable future portends a 
decrease in the available military personnel that can be employed in the overseas 
presence mission. While this is not disengagement per se, the proximate result of fiscal 
austerity may be perceived as exactly that. Business as usual on a global scale simply 
cannot continue in an era of static or decreasing budgets. Fortunately, the recently 
published United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region articulated 
the' ... commitment to maintain a stable forward presence in the region, at the existing 
level of about 100,000 troops, for the foreseeable futu re . " (Perry, February 1995, 
letter of promulgation) 
Should current trends continue, as the United States' ability to garner influence 
wanes, Japanese influence will grow. This, however , is not a situation that the United 
States should attempt to restrain. Rather, it should be exploiten for the benefit of the 
national interests of both Japan and the United States. As mentioned above. this will 
be a slow process for the following reasons: 
The Japanese government operates on consensus -- this hinders decision-
making. 
Government-lo-business ties are deep rooted -- the current position of 
business in Japanese society will be very difficult 10 change. For Japan to 
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emerge as a "normal nation," business and domestic issues will, 
occasion, have to be subordinated to foreig n policy. 
So long as coalition governments preside, foreign affairs will be 
subordinated to domestic issues due to the hroad support required to 
maintain the coalition. 
Constitutional prohibitions on military forces preclude "normal nation" 
status -- mil itarily weak countries have traditionally lacked "respect" in the 
international system. 
During the transition process under which both countries are now operating, the 
opportunity for a true partnership has availed itself. Internal critics such as Ozawa and 
Ishihara have expressed the notion that Japan has neither the expertise nor experience to 
effectively conduct foreign relations. They cite four and one half decades of a foreign 
policy that has been little more than a series of responses to U.S. stimuli. Yet despite 
this questionable experience, the Japanese have taken steps away from isolationism 
toward global involvement. A new policy based on the union of United States foreign 
,policy experience and Japanese financial resources could form a powerful synergy. At 
present, the security component of the United States-Japan relationship takes advantage 
of these very same conditions -- U.S. experience and expenise, and Japanese financial 
resources . While a true partnership exists in the security leg of the relationship tr iad , 
no such partnership exists in either the political or economic legs. The security 
component should be utilized as a model for the future, or hener said, the next 
incarnation, of the relationship -- a mutually beneficial political-military-economic 
cooperation between partners that bring different but equally important components to 
54 
the relationship . Based L1pon the cLlrrcntly unchallenged power of the United States and 
the pace of change in Japan, the growth and evolution of the partnership can move 
incrementally which will minimize the problems inher~nt with any change. 
Japan's economic interdependence precludes isolationism . The desire to take a 
larger global role is both logical and unavoidable. Tbe United States is still seeking the 
spoils of the Cold War victory a Peace Dividend'! In its quest to realize this 
possibly unattainable and elusive aberration, the United States will have to face the 
reality that while still second -to-none in military capability. it can no longer afford to 
be the world's policeman. (Despite the Nixon Doctrine, the United States has 
continued to fulfi ll this role.) In partnership with th~ United States, Japan can move 
toward normalcy while the partnership itself wil l continue to provide regional stabi lity 
and allay the fears of Asian neighbors wary of a resurgent Japan. 
2. A Nuclear-armed Japan 
Accepting the premise of Japan's ab ili ty to assemble nudear weapons on short 
notice, the recent vote in favor of an indefinite extension of the NPT may seem 
ambiguous if not contrary. Should Japan "breakout," it would not be a preccdent-
setting event. Both Iraq and North Korca are NPT signatories . Both had nascent 
weapons programs under the shroud and fa lse sense of security (of other nations) 
7 While not a panacea for reducing the national debt. the defense budget will have to 
accept its share of cuts so long as rdative peace prevails and no challenge to U.S. 
military power emerges. That is the long-t~rm reality of the Peace Dividend. 
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provided by the NPT. Japan's thrce non-nuclear principles and the nuclear allergy 
syndrome provide yet another layer of "protection.' Can Japan take its permanent seat 
on the UN Security Council with only self-defense forces and no nuclear weapons? If 
it does, it will be the first such country to do so. Can Japan take its place among the 
normal nations of the world when dependent on another for defense and deterrent 
forces? The immed iate answer to these question would seem to be, no. It must be 
remembered, however , that "normal nation.~' as currently defined are also held hostage 
by the Cold War paradigm. Nevertheless, so long as weapons of mass destruction 
exist, mechanisms to preclude their employment are required . Up until now, 
deterrence has been ensured by the balancing of opposing arsenals and security 
guarantees, both positive and negative, extended over non-nuclear-weapons states. 
Since neither disarmament nor the end of the Cold War has significantly affeete<l 
prevailing deterrence theory and practices, it is safe to assume that, so long as nuclear 
weapons exist, normal powers will find it necessary to maintain a deterrence capability. 
Until nuclear weapons can be neutralized before they cause any damage, opposing 
nuclear forces will provide that deterrence capability. Consequently , is it hard to 
envision why a country would desire nuclear weapons'! As Japan moves from isolation 
and dependency to global involvement and political autonomy, the case only gets 
stronger. Additionally, should the eurrent conllict engulfing the economic leg of the 
United States-Japan relationship escalate and spill-over, Japan may want to be prepared 
to provide for its own defense. While no real threat appears on the horizon, Japan 
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would be ill-equipped to provide for its own defense in the absence of U.S. forces. 
Nuclear forces could provide the buffer needed for a build-up of Japanese conventional 
forces, Security and prestige are most often cited as the reasons for nuclear 
proliferation, In the case of Japan, the latter is more applicable at the current time. 
The future may require the former as wel l. • A separate (from the United States) 
Japanese defence capability would require nuclear arms.' (Nishimura, 30 July 1992, 
p. 13) 
Colin Gray, noted security strategist from the University of Hull, believes that 
the furure will bring additional nuclear weapons states - ' ... we can slow the 
(proliferation) process. make it more costly politically and financially, but we can't 
stop it." (Gray, 2 May 1995) Kathleen Bailey, another notoo nuclear strategist, argues 
that wh ile the NIT is an essential element to an overall non-proliferation strategy, it 
" ... does not handle the really hard cases," (citoo by Gray, :2 May 1995) nor is it a 
precursor to nuclear disarmament. 'Because there is no effective verification for 
nuclear disarmament, potential proliferators might be inspired to pursue nuclear 
weapons and those nations that already have them might decide to secretly retain 
them." (Bailey , July 1994 p, 16) 
Shortly before he left office, Secretary of Defense Les Aspin introduced the 
Counter Proliferation Initiative (CPI). The CPI .~ecks to develop the systems and 
tactics to eliminate the prolifcrator's capability once it is detected. The mere existence 
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of a policy such as this indicates that the non-proliferation measures8 taken up until that 
time have in some way fai led. The policy-makers have just admitted what the 
strategists have predicted. Once the threshold criteria (political will. financing, 
availability of fissile material, and technology) are met, the decision belongs to the 
potential proliferator. In short, it is Japan -- not the United State.~, the NIT , or the 
international community -- that will decide whether Japan becomes a nuclear weapons 
state. 
3. The United States-Japan Relationship: A View Over Time 
The single common trend that has endured in the United State.~-Japan 
relationship since 1945 is thc ability of thc relationship to evolve along with the 
changes in the world situation. In addition to its adaptability, the relationship has been 
characterized by a pragmatic rather than principled approach to address changing world 
evcnts. Despite what is currently transpiring in the cconomic arena, the United States 
and Japan are nearly inseparable and deeply interdepcndent from an economic 
perspective. The United States is Japan's leading market. Japan is second only to 
Great Britain in direct investment in the United States. Japan, although mature in its 
civil nuclear power program, still depends on the seaborne importation of over 70 
8 Exam ination of the literature indicates that prior to the CPI, the Nonproliferation 
Regime consisted of the following components: the NPT; the International Atomic 
Energy Agency (TAEA); Nuclear Weapons Free Zones: export controls; and security 
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percent of its energy needs. Japan is incapable of protecting the sea lanes upon which 
that oil travels. It currently relies on regional stability and the big stick of thc United 
States Seventh Fleet for that protection. That same oil is essential to Japan's 
production-based economy. The finished goods of that economy head to the United 
States, lapan's single largest market, also almost exclusively via the sea. In sum, the 
United States is a vital component of the Japanese economy. 
The current interdependence of the two countries coupled with the ability of the 
relationship to adapt to thc current world situation indicate that the future of the 
relationship is bright. The future partnership must incorporate new elements if the 
relationship is going to enter iL~ third incarnation. Among these are: 
A politiClJI equalization of the relationship -- the United States must accept 
less deference and more autonomy in Japanese foreign policy. 
The Japanese must be willing to engage in foreign policy beyond financial 
contributions. This trend has al ready begun. 
Japanese society must be willing to accept the responsib ilit ies and sacrifices 
associated with global involvement. Market protections will have to be 
discarded before the global community will accept Japan as a normal nation. 
Thc Japanese must bc willing to contribute more to their own defense. 9 
The United Stales must be prepared. to accept a new nuclear-anned aliy. 
Japan. Tacit approval (in lieu of public acknowledgment) as has been the 
9 While the Japanese expanded thdr capabilities somewhat during the fina l stages of the 
Cold War (due in large measure to the encouragement of the Reagan administration) , 
more recent trends have indicated a willingness to pay more of the costs of U.S. forces 
while reducing expenditures on the JSDF. While this is cost effective in the short 
term. it does not contribute to the reputation expected of a burgeoning "normal 
nation .• 
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case with Israel is not appropriate for a union with the leadership potential 
of the United States-Japan partnership. 
Both the United States and Japan must pursue development of the 
appropriate architecture for a new regional security wategy for East Asia 
The partnership must lead this effort. 
The above recommendations while consistent with previous trends and current 
realities must also be examine<! within the greater context of a strategic vision. In 
order to formulate the most appropriate strategy, the development of the strategic 
vision must prcccde the formulation of the strategy. Otherwise 'we will be fighting the 
last war" instead of the next one. Do not put the cart before the horse. 
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V. CONCLUSIONS AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
A. A STRATEGIC VISION . 'OR EAST ASIA 
I shall be wntent if it i~ judged useful by those inquirers who desire an 
exact knowledge of the past as an aid to the interpretation of the future 
which in the course of human things must resemble if it does not reflect 
it. 
Thucydides 
The History of the Peioponnesia!l War 
431-413 Be 
Book 1 Section 22 
The future as understood by Thucydides contained element~ of the past as well 
as unique events as yet unseen. The common thread that connects the pa.~t with the 
present and future is the human interface which while not as consistent a.~ scientific law 
is almost always more predictable than the weather. But in order to develop an 
effective strategy to deal with the uncertainty inherent in future events. strategic 
planners must combine that mirror of the past with a portal to the future This is best 
accomplished through the creations of scenarios. 
Scenario planning is about making choices today with an understanding 
of how they might turn out. In this context, the precise definition of 
scenario is: a tool for ordering one's perceptions about alternative future 
environments in which one's decisions might be played out. (Schwartz, 
1991, p. 4) 
Thus far the United States-Japan relationship has been examined primarily within the 
context of events of Japane.~e and American origin. To develop a strategic vision, the 
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scenario must bc expanded to include probable occurrences in a much wider 
environment. An assumption is usually made when dealing in the realm of security 
planning: If the worst case is covered, all lesser contingencies will also be covered. 
Then, the budgetary constraints are factored in which will reduce the overall capability 
to something less than 'worse case" but, as a rule, an excess capability will exist for 
the vast majority of situations in which the capability will be utilized. 
Although "defense" is a public good and the taxpayers arc the equivalent of 
shareholders, security rather than profit is the objective of the strategy. Additionally, 
not having to employ a capability is as much a measure of successful strategy as 
successful employment of that same capability. Consequently, the government when 
face<! with a credible threat to national security, can usually plan for the worst case. 
The scenarios that follow have been developed through analysis of historic 
trends, assessment of current capability, and the incorporation of similar "human 
thing.~" resulting from the collapse of the Soviet Union. The future is uncertain -- that 
is the only given. The bipolar system which gave form and structure to the period 
from 1950 until 1990 no longer exists. The relationships resulting from the systemic 
bipolar alignment mayor may not retain relevance today and in the future. 
Scenarios generally take one of three forms: . .. more of the same, but better; 
worse; and different but better.' (Schwartz, 1991, p. 20) Since assuming the best 
(scenarios one and three) is an inappropriate "Way to approach security planning, 
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scenario number two , ' worse' -- tempered by t:urn:nt rt:alities and historic trends _ 
will be the approach utilized to craft the strategic vision for Ea~t Asian security. 
1. The Cbina Question 
The future of East Asia cannot be envisioned without considering the role of 
China. China has ccrtainly entered a peri(xi of rapid economic growth. NO! only is 
China a country in the process of economic transition, it is a country that is rapidly 
moderniling as well. The United Slates has recogniled the impmtanct: ·of China 
through recent policy decisions. The Clinton administration opted to extend Most 
l'avored Nation status despite little or no movement on human rights hy the Chinese. 
The Congress recently passed a resolution preventing thc visi t of the Taiwanese 
President in dcference to Chincse desires. Tht: United States' stance on Chinese 
disregard for intellectual property rights was somewhat softer than that taken regarding 
U.S. auto parts entering Japan. A U.S. Navy ship visited Tsing Tao in March 1995, 
the tlrst such visit since the incident at Tianamen Square. Defense St:cretary Perry 
visited Bcijing. While the individual evenls may lKlt seem too important, collcctively 
they signal that the (Jnited States is willing to put Tainamen in the past and look toward 
the futurc. China, with its massive population, rapidly growing economy, and military 
modernization program, will S(X)ll compete with Japan for t:conomit: and political 
influence in East Asia. Good relations between China, the United StateS, and Japan arc 
in the national interest of all three countries. 
63 
Traditionally, China has been a continental power. The collapse of the Soviet 
Union, however, has enabled the Peoples' Liberation Army (PLA) to devote assets to 
strategies other than defense of the immense common border. During the fi rst decade 
of the 21st century, greater China will probably have the largest economy in the 
world. (Greenhouse, 20 May 1993, p. At) This down-sizing of ground forces coupled 
with the hard currency available from the economic boom has given birth to revised 
thinking and force modernization. Th~ PLA Air Force has been able to obtain front-
line aircraft, SU-27's, from the arsenal of the Former Soviet Union. The PLA Navy 
has been gradually Changing its strategy as well. (See Figure 1, p. 65). Despite the 
rapid growth and massive increases in expenditures, the PLA Navy by all estimates is 
nothing more than coastal defense force. (Morgan, March 1994, p. 33) China is not 
yet a threat. In fact , "(i) t would be a mistake to sound the general alarm solely on the 
basis of China's current military build-up. China's power lies in its potential. " 
(Forsythe, August 1994, pp, 40-41 ), 
The Chinese do not want to be perceived as a threat. "Peaceful coexistence ' 
and "good neighbor " arc two terms that were frequently used during four separate 
roundtable discussions lO in wh ieh the author participated during a trip to Beijing in 
10 The groups with which the discussions took place included: PLA Aead~my of 
Military Science, Chinese l!l~titute for Strategic Studies , China Academy of Social 
Sciences and China Institute of Contemporary International Relations. 
64 
April 1995. China is committed to the Five Principles of Peaceful Coexistence: (1) no 
interference in the internal affairs of other countries; (2) no prejudice; (3) no enemies; 
Blue.Water 2029 
c ontinent.] 19€13 
=-
db 
Figure 1: The Evolution of PRe Naval Strategy!! 
(4) the peaceful settlement of disputes; and (5) active defense. Additionally, it 
was implied that other nations (read the United States and Japan) should also follow the 
Chinese example. 
11 Adapted from a presentation by the PLA Navy Research Institute at the Naval 
Postgraduate School , 15 April 1994. The strateg ies defined prior to and including "Off 
Shore" were expressed by the PLAN officers. The future strategies are projections of 
the author. 
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The Chinese also expressed their views concerning Japan. A recurrent theme --
the Japanese Right Wing is a dangerous element -- seemed to overshadow the reality 
that Sino-Japanese relations have improved since the Chinese began their economic 
reform program. When pressed regarding this nascent Japanese militarism, Wang Jisi 
of the China Academy of Social Sciences admitted that, while in fundamental 
disagreement with China's policy regarding the overseas basing of troops, the U.S. 
presence enabled by the United States-Japan relationsh ip contributed to regional 
stability. General Cai, Director of the PLA Academy of Military Science, on the other 
hand, said that the United States-Japan Security Treaty " ... ha~ not played a clear role 
in containing the militarization of Japan . ... Other measures are necessary." (Wang, 7 
April 1995) The implication is clear: If not for the United States-Japan relationship, 
China would consider Japan a military threat despite Japan's current lack of power 
projection capahility. Should China move to counter that perceived threat in the future, 
a security dilemma would emerge. Over twenty years ago, Donald Hellman 
hypothesized that Japan and China would once again be competitors in Asia. He also 
understood the role of military power in the calculus. 
The two superpowers and the Chinese recognize that peace in Asia, even 
if achieved by diplomatic maneuver, ultimately depends on a "power 
balance" rooted in military force, and all see Japan a~ inevitably playing 
an expanded security role. (Clapp and Halperin, 1974, p. 166) 
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Consequently, China must be involved with both the United States and Japan to 
create the environment must conducive to continued stability in the region. finally , 
while the Chinese shunned the concepts of alliances and collective security in East 
Asia, they were desirous of expanded bi lateral and multi-lateral relationships as well as 
regional and sub-regional dialogues and fora to include expanded cooperation with the 
United States. They cxprcssed particularly high cxpcctations for the future of the Asian 
Regional Forum. While championing the efforts of rather benign regional fora, 
General Cai discounted the viabili ty of a United Statcs-China-Japan leadership role 
opting instead for the inclusion of Russian and ASEAN. 
Overall, Chinese policy seemed clear and consistent -- as if everyone regardless 
of occupation or affiliation was citing the same document. Deeper discussion . 
however, revealed instances of ambiguity and subtle contradiction. They seldom 
agreed or disagreed with any substantive view of the future. Consequently , a 
reasonable synthesis of reality and potential would include the following element~: 
The Chinese economy will continue to grow and they will have the hard 
currency to sustain a substantial military huild-up, 
The Chinese have an inherent distrust of Japan, 
As the Chinese expand economically. their ties to the rest of the world will 
grow; they believe that economic interdependence fosters political stability. 
(Fu, 7 April 1995 and Luo, 10 April 1995) 
Departure of U.S. forces would be cause for concern. 
The Chinese will not formally participate in a regional security structure in 
the near-term. 
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• The Chinese wish to have expanded contact with the United States. 
2. Korean Unification 
As previously discussed, the current justification for such a large U.S. presence 
in East Asia is to support the North Korean regional contingency. As was state<! during 
the Symington hearings in 1970 and the more recent Clinton administration Bottom-Up 
Reviw, our commitment to the security of South Korea was and is the anticipated 
contingency upon which our East Asian presence is based. While ready to deploy 
anywhere in the Pacific theater, the primary mission of the U.S. Marines at Okinawa is 
to reinforce the U.S. Army ground forces garrisoned in South Korea. The U.S. 
Seventh Fleet serves a similar function. Korean Unification, therefore, could have a 
profound impact on U.S. presence in East Asia. Just as with the peaceful reunification 
of Germany , the peaceful unification of Korea would engender a call to "bring the 
troops home ." Certainly those forces of the 8TH U.S. Army and 7TH U.S. Air Force 
I (both hased in Korea) would head home having complete<! their mission just as their 
counterparts in West Berlin did. The reinforcements in Japan will also have "lost' a 
significant aspect of their post-Cold War mission. 
The author was recently in Seoul and had the opportunity to speak with several 
high-ranking members of the academic and government establishments including the 
Prime Minister. The opinions offered regard ing unification in each case were nearly 
identical. Statesmen, former statesmen, academics, and the academic-tumed-statesman 
all believed that North Korea was not capable of forceful unification. They offered a 
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second opinion that is also noteworthy: While South Korea desires unification, it must 
be ' peacefu l and gradual. " Having observed German unification, South Korea real izes 
that an immediate absorption of the North would have disastrous effeet~ on both of the 
Koreas. Despite the recent rise in tensions a~sociated with the North Korean nuclear 
program, all were hopeful that reunification talks could be resumed with the North . 
The Prime Minister believed that reunification talks would resume in the summer of 
1995. (Lee, 13 April 1995) 
Although North Korea preoccupies the South' s strategic planning process, Japan 
is not exempt. In the office of Song Young-Sun. Director of the Japan Section at 
Korea Institute for Defense Analysis, one cannot escape the large chart on the wall 
which displays the Japanese order of batt le. While guarded in her comments, Dr. Song 
believes that Japan will not threaten Korea so long as the United States-Japan security 
relationship rema ins intact. She , like the author, believes that the future of the United 
States-Japan relationship is linked to the issue of Korean unification. Further, she 
admitted that a unified Korea could be perceived as a threat by Japan. Her solution for 
post-unification stability (assuming a greatly reduced U.S. military presence) was for 
the United States to remain engaged poli tically and" ... use the China card .... Play Japan 
against China and vice versa.' (Song, 14 April 1995) The key to the entire situation is 
U.S. involvement and presence. Should the United States disengage militarily due to 
the absence of the North Korean threat. ironicall y, the reg ion may become less stable 
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just as the peninsula becomes more stable. "Your first step from bilateral to 
multilateral (relationships) must include China." (Song, l4 April 1995) 
3, Sources of Potential Conflict 
a. The Spratly Islands 
The Spratly Islands are claimed by China, the Philippines, Vietnam, 
Brunei, and Malaysia. While more threats than shots have been exchanged, both China 
and the Philippines have (marginally) fo rtified some of the outcroppings of rock in 
attempts to bolster their claims. Additionally, China, Vietnam, and the Philippines 
have sent warships to monitor the area and enforce their claims. Why so much effort 
for a grouping of remote islands many of which are submerged at high tide? The 
simple answer is, oi\. While only preliminary exploration has been undertaken due to 
the disputed claims, it is believed that a substantial reserve lies beneath the Sprntlys. 
All of the disputants would like to be in possession of the oil and the subsequent 
revenues. The production-based economies that have been the formula for recent Asian 
economic success are highly energy dependent. A cheap, long-term source of energy 
for any of the disputants would contribute greatly to economic growth. Additionally, a 
ready market with plenty of cash exists in Japan as well. It should bc remembered that 
during the 1930's, Japan referred to the larger area which encompasses the SpratJys 
the Southern Resource Area. The United States threatened war should Japan move in 
that direction in 1941. (Sagan, 1994, pp. 64-67) Japan's energy dependency is well 
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documented and has already been discussed. A war has already I:x:t:n fought this 
decade [or access to oil. 
h. Military Build-ups in the East Asian .'Ille's 
Tht: Nt:wly Induslrialized Cuuntries of East Asia have been undergoing 
massive military acquisitiun programs over the past ten to fifteen years. All of these 
countries, as are nt:arly all Ea5t Asian counlries, are maritime nations. Consequently, 
the majority of tht: acquisitions havt: been naval weapons syslems. It is not that this 
phenomenon has eluded inlelligence analysts and strategic planners, but rather these 
countries began with such a minimal capahility that their current arsenals have not yet 
reached the point where they can challenge the JMSDF or the U.S. Seventh Fleel. 
Simply put, the currenl balance of power has nol heen suhstantjally altered. 
Additionally, these build-ups have halaneoo against each other. While the overall 
capability may not be alarming, the growth rate is not unlike the 1920's which resulted 
in a full-blown conference on naval armaments at London in 1930. 
Surplus-generating economies such as is the case in the va>t majority of 
East Asia (DPRK, Vietnam, and the Philippines excepted) have the abililY to rapidly 
obtain military hardware. The end of the Cold War has crealed a "buyers" market. 
For example, the Indonesian Navy has concluded a transaction that enabkd them to 
acquire over half of the former East German Navy. Former Soviet weaponry is also 
available at bargain-basement prices. The newly industrialized countries of East Asia 
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have hard currency. The world's arms manufacturers have an inventory glut. The 
combination of these two realities creates a situation that could easily escalate into a 
full -blown arms race. In an environment where maritime security is paramount to 
economic survival and naval expansion is off and running (See Table 1, p. 73), why 
has nO! the security dilemma phenomenon taken over? Quite simply, the continued 
presence of the U.S. Seventh Fleet is and has been a Stabilizing influence in what 
otherwise could be a highly volatile and unstable region of the world . 
Additionally, numbers alone do not a navy make. John Arquilla, former 
RAND analyst and current NPS professor said that it takes three generations for a 
world-class navy to evolve. That axiom requires a little updating. The three-
generations logic was based upon an indigenous weapons production capability. As 
was mentioned above, this has been compacted with vast sums of hard currency and 
high availability of hardware on the world market. Nevertheless, despite Indonesia's 
attempt, you may be able to buy a navy; but you cannot buy military seafaring 
expertise. The Indian Navy Chakra (Soviet Charlie-class SSGN) and the Iranian 
"Kilos' have proven that case in point. 12 Capability takes training and training takes 
time. Ready-made hardware may shave a generation off the axiom. Despite the trends 
12 TIle Indians leased a Charlie-class SSGN from the Soviet Union but returned it 
because they were unable to operate it~ systems in the ahsence of Soviet training 
technicians. Similarly , when Iran purchased Russian Kilo-class submarines their 
delivery was delayed as the Iranian crews faile<! to attain operating proficiency during 
the contracted training period. 
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expressed in Table 1. it will take a while before hardware turns into capability. If the 
Seventh Fleet comes home, the power vacuum may he filled by conflicts between lhe 
less powerfu l navies. In an unstable security environment , the processes of tra ining and 
acquisition will be accelerated . In the mC<lntime, the navies of the NIC's will continue 
to perform thei r constabulary functions while simultaneously training to employ the 
capabilities attained through their moderni7.a tion programs. 
TataiShips • %QMh 
Table 1: The Growth of Asian Naval Forces 1981-1993 
(Adapted From: Morgan, March 1994) 







Just because this has been an elu'sive concept in the past does not mean it is 
destined to be unattainable in the future . Many c ircumstances have changed. East Asia 
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has never faced a common threat other than Western colonialism and Japanese 
conquest. Had the nations been states in the face of those threats, it is possible that 
some type of collective arrangement might have evolved. The former colonies moved 
directly into the bipolar structure of the Cold War world. The alignment took shape as 
the United States re lied upon bilateral arrangements to set up it~ perimeter of 
containment. The one attempt at collective security, SEATO, the South East Asian 
Treaty Organization, did indeed fail, The gap between the Newly Industrialized 
Countries (NICs) and the non-industrialized countries has widened. The NICs have 
much greater capability while the Third World can no longer rely on the Soviet Union 
for assistance. 
Because of the inherent distrust among the major non-belligerent military 
powers in East Asia -- Japan, China, and South Korea -- collective security will be 
difficult. Additionally, the role of Russia would have to be considered. While the 
United States is exhibiting great deference toward Russia at present. one of the other 
major players envisioned for any East Asian security arrangement. Japan, still has not 
signed a WWIl Peace Treaty with Russia. Japan, despite its commercial ties, overseas 
investment, and Offtcial Developmental Assistance program, is stil! viewed by its 
Asian neighbors as a nascent hegemonic imperialistic state. Indonesia's Mahatir stands 
alone with his publicly articulated position that Japan need not continue apologizing for 
its actions during World War II. Both South Korea and China have voiced contra(), 
opinions. They want apologies, admissions, and in some cases reparations. 
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For the short term, it appears that utili:.:ing the existing fora, like i\PEC's Asian 
Regional Forum, to ensure a continuous dialogue between neighhor~ is about as much 
can be expected, The Chinese, who must be included, prefer sub-regional 
organizations. They cite the failure of NATO and the CSeE with regard to resolution 
of problems in the former Yugoslavia as evidence against a similar ~tructure for i\sia. 
While they champion the i\RF, lIle Chinese ridicule the parent organi7.ation APEC as 
"unable to shift from an economic-political organization to incorporate security" (Fu, 
7 April 1995) The growing economic ties will also mandate cooperation even between 
competitors, The more !.hey learn about each other, the more confident they will 
hccomc with their own security (provided no hidden agendas cxist). Once trust is 
estabJishctl through dialogues, personnel exchanges, enhanced transparency, joint 
exercises and Olher confidence building measures, the benefits of collective action 
should outweigh the fears. i\s most East Asian countries conduct similar operations 
with the United States already, this can hc a huilding hloek for expanded contacts 
Multi-national exercises could be the dircct Outgrowth of currcnt hilateral cxercises. 
Multi-national operations could be the next step with collcctivc security or collective 
defensc heing the ultimate goal. With an effective collective security organization in 
place, the United States could decrease its personnel and material commitments without 
risking a decr~se in regional stability. 
While this is the ideal, it appears that a generation of relative calm may have to 
pass before the Japanese, Koreans, and Chinese will sit down at the same table in the 
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absence of a common threat. Perhaps the United States could propose a new policy 
based upon an architecture that integrates the existing five East Asian bilateral 
relationships without replacing them. 
B. A..1\' EXPA.."IDED ARClDTECTURE FOR EAST ASIAN SECURITY 
The United States should not be entangled in any relationship that prevents it 
from pursuing its national interest. The current security structure in East Asia is a 
vestige of the Cold War. The five remaining bilateral relationships] 3 developed during 
the Cold War were sufficient when the primary enemy of all the proteges was 
Communism. Today, however, it is conceivable, though presently a remote probability, 
that two or more of the five bilateral a ll ies could end up on opposite sides of an armM 
conflict. Additionally and even more importantly. China is conspicuously absent from 
the security structure in the region. Both of these inconsistencies must be corrected in 
the future . 
Rather than dismantling the current system when no al ternative exists, it would 
be logical to expand the current system. Utilizing the existing five East Asian bilateral 
relationships as the foundation , the new structure would also encompass existing 
regional and sub-regional non-security organizations such as APEC and ASEAN . 
13 The five remaining bilateral security relationships (the United States and: Japan ; 
South Korea; the Philippines; Thailand; and Australia) devolved from a total of seven 
Cold War relationships which formerly inCluded another bilateral with Taiwan; a multi-
lateral: the South East Asia Treaty Organization (SEATO) ; and a trilateral: Australia, 
New Zealand, United States (ANZUS). 
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This will not be an easy task. Supranational organizations are viewed as 
infringing upon national sovereignty. China, a key player, has gone on record 
opposing "European-style" collective security organizations. Inherent distrust as well 
as the fear of over-control by the United States must be overcome. Those countries 
that already have bilateral agreements with the United States must be convinced that the 
new organization makes them more rather than less secure despite the expansion of 
U.S. commitments. The existing regional and sub-regional organizations must retain 
an element of autonomy or they will he alienate<! from the start. Over time. their 
functions can be absorbed by the larger collective. In essence. the existing 
organizations and fora would be graduaJJy absorbed as their functions become needless 
duplications of those performed by the new entity . 
While this may seem unnecessary at present. the first condition of entry into the 
"East Asian Security and Cooperation Organization" would be the signing of a non-
I aggression pact with the other members. The United States could start the ball rolling 
by having the nations with wbich it has bilateral relationships enter the pact as a 
condition of continued bilateral cooperation. A non-aggression pact is also consistent 
with China's articulated policies -- peaceful coexistence and being a good neighbor--
regarding security. A regional non-aggression pact would not only enhance regional 
stability. but would also allay the inherent distrust, rerluce the likelihood of regional 
arms races, and lead to expanded cooperation in political and economic intercourse. 
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Russia has not been addressed . It is perhaps the most difficult piece of the East 
Asian security puzzle. If Russia is not included, this could hamper other United States-
Russian init iatives. At present, however , the United States can support the exclusion of 
Russia until such time as it executes a WWII peace treaty with Japan. The war must 
end before the peace can begin . 
While not attempting to solve the myriad of problems associated with this 
undertaking, one cannot dispute the intrinsic value and financial advanrages to the 
proposed EASCO. The author agrees that this will be a long-term process ba.~ed upon 
a gradual expansion which culm inates with the absorption of the formerly autonomous 
organizations. Parvis e glmuiibus quercus. 
C. A PRAGMATIC APPROACH TO ALLIED NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION 
The United States' approach to nuclear proliferation is ba.~ed upon the non-
scientific, untested logic and prophecy expressed nearly three and a half decades ago by 
Sir Charles P. Snow. On 27 December 1960. he delivered an address to the American 
Association for the Advancement of Science in New York City entitled "The Moral 
Unneutrality of Science." He said, in part: 
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We know with the certainty of statistical truth that jf enough of these 
weapons are made -- by elKlugh differem states -- some of them are 
going to blow up. Through accident, madness, or folly -- but the 
motives do nO! matter. What does matter is the TIature of lhe statistical 
fact. ... (This) is not a risk but a arms race between the 
US and the USSR not only continues 
join in. Within at most six years China and several other states will have 
a stock of nuclear bombs. Within at most ten years some of these bombs 
are going off. (Schlesinger, March 1967, p. 3) 
Ten, then twenty, and now over thirty years have passed and not a single 
nuclear weapon has been detonated except under test circumstances. The logic seemed 
.~traigh t-forward enough: the more weapons in existence, the higher the likelihood of a 
detonation. Despite the simplicity of Sir Charles' logic, his prophecy failed to comc to 
fruition. Nevertheless, il is similarly struclured logic that has perpetuated the blanket 
"all proliferation is had" approach that has been and is the guiding principle of the U.S. 
policy regarding nuclear weapons. When it was clear that the nuclear monopoly would 
not last, the United States anempted to manage proliferation. When it ""'-as clear the 
other nation-states would develop nuclear weapons, the number of those states had to 
be minimized. Diplomacy, political incentives, and security guarantees worked in 
concert toward the goal of no proliferation beyond the "original five." International 
la",," under the umbrella of supranational legitimacy - the Nuclear Nonproliferation 
Treaty - seemed to dovetail perfectly with the overall goal of U.S. nonproliferation 
policy. Twenty-five years later, the NPT despite its shortcomings and failures, remains 
the cornerstone of U.S. nonproliferation policy. Not only is the NPT unenforceable, 
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but it has fa iled to prevent proliferation among its signatories. While the list of 
compliant states far exceeds the list of violators, the vast majority of the Slates in 
compliance do not fulfill the prerequisite conditions for the devclopment of nuclear 
weapons. To believe that the treaty has been an unqualified success would be 
extremely naive. 
Additionally, with the exception of Israel, the United States has not been faced 
with the prospect of an ally a~ an emergent proliferator. The United Slates, however, 
has gone to great lengths to ensure that Israel would not be put in a situation which 
might engender a nuclear response. The Patriot missile battery deployments to Israel 
during the Gulf War arc a ca~e in point. While the deployments had a dual purpose _. 
to keep Israel out of the war and prevent a nuclear response (to a chemical attack) -- the 
latter implies tacit U.S. acknowledgment of Israeli nuclear capability. Consequently, 
the reality of operative U.S. nonproliferation policy is not so ·blanket~ after all. It is 
• both pragmatic and selecLive. Since U.S. aid to Israel exceeds all other U.S. foreign 
aid, a large lever exists to exert diplomatic (and economic) pressure should the United 
States desire to treat Israel as it would other potential proliferators. Such pressure was 
brought to bear against Pakistan, another virtual nuclear power, when previously 
arranged arms sales were withheld. No such (dis)incentive ever appeared to have been 
employed against Israel. 
Japan, also an ally of the United State~, is (as has heen indicated earlier) a 
virtual nuclear proliferator. Should Japan decided to convert its virtual capability into 
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an operational capabi li ty, the United States should be prepared to do more than offer 
tacit approval as it has with Israel. This, however, poses a problem as ' welcoming 
Japan 10 the nuclear club" would be a gigantic slap in the face of the NIT, 
Additionally, overt acceptance of a new nuclear power would constitute a reversal of 
nearly fifty years of U.S, policy. Despite the otherwise pragmatic approach to the 
fo rmulation of U,S, foreign policy, such a departure would be highly unlikely, 
Nevertheless it must be considered. 
In 1990, Kenneth N. Waltz, professor of Political Science at the University of 
California, Berkeley, published a progressive yet controversial article. He challenged 
the school of thought based upon the logic of those who believed as C. P. Snow did. 
Specifically, Waltz advocated that" ... nuclear weapons are in fact a tremendous force 
for pcace and afford nations that possess them the possibility of security at a reasonable 
cost. ' (Waltz, September 1990, p. 731) Although his conclusions are drawn primarily 
from the Un ited States-Soviet Union deterrence experience, his argument has nearly 
five decades of "ground truth data" upon which to rest. The author of this thes is 
advocates coming down somewhere in between the minimnlist argument of Snow and 
the deterrence optimist argument of Waltz. Specifically, nuclear proliferation should 
be handled by the United Slates on a case-by-case ba.~is . While proliferation by a rogue 
country may be strenuously opposed, the proliferation by an ally may be accepted if it 
is in the interest of the United States. North Korea can serve as a case-in-point for the 
former, Japan or Germany may serve as the example for the latter. 
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Lt is fooLish to ignore reality in pursuit of the unattainabLe goal of 
nonproliferation. The reaL purpose or end of U.S. nonproliferation policy is to prevent 
a nuclear detonation whether by accident or in anger . The means has been to Lim it the 
number of nuclear weapons states (NWS). WhiLe this may seen logical, it discountS the 
more supportable argumentS that nuclear proliferation and the consequent parity can 
contribute to both regional and international stability. The end is stiLI a noble and most 
desirable goal. It should remain one of the paramount pursuitS of mankind as well as 
U.S. foreign policy. The means, however, require modification until such time that 
international law supersedes self-interest as the force that shapes states' behavior. 
In a world where proliferation is a reality -- more than the "original five" NWS 
are now in possession of nuclear weapons -- it is clear that despite the good intentions 
of the major powers and international law, statcs will indeed pursue self-interest. 
Comb ining reality with the real end, nuclear nonuse. the way can be paved for a 
revised. policy that is both revolutionary and pragmatic. Rather than a "head-in-the-
sand ,· blanket approach to nonproliferation, the author advocates a selective approach 
to proliferation. Colin Gray is also an advocate of selective proliferation and views it 
as an essential element of what he calls the "Second Nuclear Age. "14 In ,essence, he 
calls for a new policy which supports the national interest of the United States. He 
14 The First Nuclear Age coincided with the Cold War. The Second Nuclear Age, 
Gray believes , will exist until approximately 2025 when the Third Nuclear Age will 
Each has distinct characteristics and must be approached with this in mind. 
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asked, for example, whether it was it mOTC important for the United States to 
discourage Pakistani proliferation (consistent with the policy then and now) or rather to 
enlist the aid of Pakistan in support of U.S, policy towards the war in Afghanistan. His 
answer: consider the consequences and pursue the policy that best supports the national 
interest of the United States. (Gray , 2 May 1995) 
While the author agrees with the 'national interest teSt" an additional element to 
selective proliferation is nece..~sary. [n keeping with the overall goal of nuclear nonuse, 
it is logical to assume that if the United States revised its policy, and selectively accept 
proliferation, such as that of an ally, then the safety of that ally's arsenal is within the 
U.S. national interest. Consequently, the sharing of nuclear safety technologies as well 
as command and control technologies would contrihutc to thc overall goal of nuclear 
nonuse. Of course, this is contrary to thc provisions of thc current nonproliferation 
rcgime by which the United StatC$ is currently bound. Yet. since the current reg ime 
has produced less than complete success, a revolutionary new policy should not he 
dismissed without thorough analysis. 
Throughout the history of the United States, foreign policy has been guided by 
·pragmatism enriched by principle.· (Buss, 1994) In the case of Japan as a nuclear 
weapons state. the static, principle-based policy of the First Nuclear Age should hc 
replaced by a dynamic, reality-based. intcrest sensitive, and pragmatic policy of nuclear 
nonuse. Nonuse during subsequent Nuclear Ages is the end. Selct-1ive prOliferation 
should be one of the means. 
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D. USING THE PAST TO HELP ENSURE THE FUTURE 
If nothing else has been learnet! during the first fifty years of the most recent 
United States-Japan relationship, it must be remembered that the relationship has 
endured despite the disappearance of the fundamental reasons for the establishment and 
continuation of the bond, Neither Japanese disarmament nor the containment of 
communism arc relevant in 1995, Yet the relationship , however, is as essential to both 
countries as it has ever been, As the cornerstone of the East Asian Security lnitiative, 
the forward presence facilitated by the relationship anchors regional stability. Japan 
continues to enjoy the benefit of unchallenged external security while the United States 
receives the benefits of the most generous host-nation support agreement in existence. 
The symbiosis of the military relationship, however, has been overshad(w.'ed by 
the one-sided economic and political relationships, The economic advantage rests with 
Japan while the political advantage remains in American hands, Both of these 
unbalanced relationships must be equalized as the third incarnation of the relationship 
attempts to. transition from a defender-protege relationship to a symmetrical 
partnership. By incorporating the lessons of past, the realities of the present, and the 
strategic visions of the future, a new policy can and must be crafted. The resultant 
relationship will better serve the interests of both countries while simultaneously 
contributing \0 regional and global stability. In order to reach this plateau, however, 
conccssions must be granted by both sides, 
S4 
Perry's expedition provides several lessons wh ich will assist in the formulation 
of a more effective Japan policy. Perry demanded equality in intercourse. The Unitcil 
States must s imilarly offer rea~onab le equality as a condition of the revised 
relationship. Perry attempted to entice the Shogun with the tangible benefits of a 
relationship with the United States. The Japanese are well aware of the benefits and 
consequences of the United States-Japan relationship . The ulIh'ersal benefits of a 
United States-Japan partnersh ip, however. also must be highlighted. 
The United States and Japan can work in partnership to combat the common ills 
of mankind: poverty , population growth, proliferation of weapons of mass destruct ion. 
and pol lution. The United Stales' experience as a global interlocutor coupled with 
Japanese technology and resources can bring a powerful force to bear first in East Asia, 
thcn on a larger scale. The gocxlwill engendered through these type of cooperaTive 
efforts should facilitate thc establishment of an East Asian organi7..ation for security 
and cooperation. The United States-Japan partnership could hc the prime mov~r 
toward fully functional regional cooperation. 
The time has come to enhance the United States-Japan relationship. The 
political and academic estahlishmcnts of both countries have called for a continuation of 
the relationship despite the disappearance of its most recent raison d 'etre .- the Sov iet 
thrcat. "There is no more important bilateral relationship than the one we havc with 
Japan.' (U .S. DoD, February 1995, p. 10) This quotat ion is not an excerpt from a 
Cold War-era Ronald Reagan speech (although it could be) but rather taken from the 
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most recent United States Security Strategy for the East Asia-Pacific Region. Similarly, 
Prime Minister Murayama -- a member of the Socialist Party that has traditionally 
oppose<! the United States-Japan security treaty -- reaffirmed his country's commitment 
to the overall relationship and specifically, the security treaty in his policy speech to the 
132nd Diet. Regarding the summit meeting with President Clinton, he said: 
... we fully discussed the fu ture of the Japanese-U.S. cooperation and 
agreed on further enhancing our mutual cooperation for the future on a 
wide range of areas, including the security dialogue, cooperation for 
APEC's success, the resolution of global issues and support for women 
in development. At the same time, we affirmed anew that we will 
firmly maintain those Japanese-U.S. security arrangements that provide 
the political foundations for this cooperative relationship. (1he Japan 
Times, 21 January 1995. p. 4) 
While the future seems bright despite the disappearance of the more compelling 
reasons of the past, the current conflict regarding trade in automobiles and automobile 
parts indicates that self-interest complicates cooperation in the economic arena. This 
must be reconcile<! if the relationship is to move forward in the spirit of a equal 
partnership. 
History has demonstrated the resilience and adaptability of the united States-
Japan relationship. While it seems that economic interdependence alone mandates an 
enduring relationship. other less tangible but equally important issues -- regional 
stability. global humanitarian and developmental assistance . defense burden sharing, 
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and joint leadership -- further underscore the nearly unlimited , universal benefits of a 
continued relationship . 
While the headlines of the spring of 1995 focus on the intractability of Japanese 
and American positioIl~ on trade matters . it should not be forgotten that comprom ise 
and concession are morc characteristic of the relationship that ha.~ endured for nearly 
five decades. When U.S. nonproliferation policy threatened the Japanese civil nuclear 
program, Ronald Reagan reversed the policy. In fact, even before the poli~y reversal, 
Jimmy Carter grantctl concessions to the Japanese that effectively mitigated the policy 
and its primary effects on Japan. Similarly and more recently , the Japanese conceded 
to a lopsided agreement with the United States for the co-production of the FS-X 
aircraft. While the Japanese were capable of manufacturing an indigenous aircraft 
except for the jet engines, under U.S. pressure they agreed to a less-capable American 
designed variant of the F-16 with sixty percent of the work (and profit) going to 
American contractors. In sum. each country has relinquished things originally 
perceived as contrdTY to national interest for the greater good of the relationship. The 
Japanese have expressed a desire to resolve the tariff on luxury automobiles before the 
policy takes effect. This is both encouraging and consistent with past behavior. 
To expect excessive Japanese deference to U.S. desires is inconsistent with the 
encouragement of greater Japanese autonomy and global political involvement. 
Conflict will emerge more frequently than in the past. The absence of the dampening 
effect formerly provided by the Sovict threat will further contribute to the volatility of 
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issues. The legacy of cooperation and the present economic necessity of a continued 
relationship should facilitate fulure attempts to resolve conflict and develop a true 
partnership. Mutual benefit, however, can be obscured by the pursuit of self-interest. 
Spill-over from the economic element into the pOlitical and security realm is 
almost inevitable . Japan, however, is still highly dependent upon the United States in 
all three aspects of the relationship. The United States -- Japan's largest market, 
Japan's nuclear and conventional defender. and Japan's political weather vane -- can 
negotiate from a poSition of strength. Japan's reach for global involvement and the 
domestic politics of both countries, however, compel the leadership of the United 
States and Japan to envision the future as well as embracing the past when resolving 
conflict today . 
The United States-Japan relationship will endure. It may not, however, endure 
in its present form. The United States should both accept and encourage Japan's larger 
role in global politics. Japan will have to open its market to foreign goods. The 
industrialized countries of the world will not welcome Japan into the polit ical club so 
long as Japan's highly protectionist trade practices exist. Similarly, Japan's best course 
of action for enhanced relations with its Asian neighbors (with the possible exception of 
Indonesia) is a continuing relationship with the United States. The United States has 
many old and several new friends in East Asia, Renewed relations with Vietnam are 
progressing swiftly (and quietly) and President Clinton j ust (June 1995) extended MFN 
status to China for another year. The Basic Framework Agreement between the United 
8S 
States and North Korea will establish yet anorher East Asian (non-security) 
relationship. Thos~ countries most wary of Japam~se power are and will be actively 
involved with the Unit~d States. A United Stat~s-Japan partnership should not change 
this. 
Japan will most likely remain a virtual nuclear proliferator. While the United 
States must consider a policy regarding allied proliferation, Japanese national interest is 
best served by continuing to remain under the nuclear umbrella of the United States 
Not only does Japan enjoy an extended deterrent second that is to non~, it is spared the 
additional cost of maintaining an operational arsenal. and spared the negative 
international opinion that would accompany "breakout. " 
The Pacific holds much of !he future of the United States. Excepting Canada, 
the largest market for U.S. goods and services is East Asia. Unlike European markets, 
the markets of East Asia are growing and rapidly so. The stability of East Asia is vital 
to the enduring national interest of the United States -- the freedom, security, and 
prosperity of its citizens. Again, "Our security alliance with Japan is the linchpin of 
United States security policy in Asia." (DoD, february 1995, p. 10) 
The next incarnation of th~ United States-Japan relationship must provide for a 
partnership -- less U.S. dominance and more Japan~~ involvement hoth internal and 
external to the relationship. This partnership in rurn must take the lead in eSlahlishing 
an overarching architecture and the subordinate fora to enable East Asian regional 
security and cooperation. The resultant stability and development will not only serve 
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the national interests of the participants. but the universal imerests of humankind will 
be served as well. 
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